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The Structural Inadequacy of Public Schools
for Stigmatized Minorities:
The Need for Institutional Remedies
by SHAVAR D. JEFFRIES*
Introduction
For decades, public schools have failed stigmatized minorities. In so
doing, schools defy state and federal constitutional rights granting
minorities effective-education services. Courts have struggled to remedy
these violations, constantly reconfiguring public-school inputs in search of
a solution. First, courts tried racial integration, then additional school
funding, and, more recently, expert-approved remedial programs. These
have not worked. Majorities of African-American and Hispanic students
fail to meet even basic proficiency standards. These efforts flounder
because courts neglect the incompatibility of racial stigma's educational
consequences and public schools' institutional conditions. Stigma uniquely
obstructs educational achievement, demanding schools with the capacity to
adapt services to meet the varied ways stigma individually affects
performance. Public schools, however, are institutionally disposed toward
uniformity, preempting the very flexibility stigmatized minorities require.
Traditional school remedies fail largely because they leave unaddressed
these institutional impediments. To vindicate minorities' educational
entitlements, courts therefore must employ institutional remedies that
reshape the structural incentives governing public-school policymaking.
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The constitution of essentially every state in the country entitles
individuals to an effective public education. While state constitutions vary
in their respective definitions, they generally guarantee an education
enabling students to participate meaningfully in the state's economic and
civic life. The federal Constitution, on the other hand, does not
affirmatively entitle individuals to education services, but the
Constitution's Equal Protection Clause requires states to provide education
services equitably if they choose to provide them at all. Among the
remedies available to litigants for federal equal-protection violations is
compensatory education designed to counteract the harms of educational
inequity. These federal remedies intersect with state-constitutional
entitlements, as compensatory education irreducibly involves services
courts find effective in enabling students to participate effectively in
society's economic and civic life. Although recent Supreme Court
decisions significantly limit the availability of federal effective-education
remedies, these interests still remain viable. In this way, based either on
direct, state constitutional rights or indirect federal remedies, essentially all
racial minorities in this country possess a constitutional promise to an
effective education.
Despite these guarantees, public schools have been chronically
ineffective in educating racial minorities. This broad ineffectiveness stems,
I argue, from the antithetical relationship between education and stigma.
Educational values, of course, reflect substantive judgments about
preferred civic, social, and cultural outcomes. These values, at the same
time, reveal presuppositions about student capacity: educational systems
teach only what its sponsors believe students can achieve. The
philosophies motivating schools therefore necessarily presume students
possess the competencies required for achieving educational objectives.
Yet, while education depends on students possessing the capacities
enabling education, social stigma attacks these very same capabilities.
Stigma refers to a trait so thoroughly discredited as to challenge the
humanity of those bearing it. Stigma thus signals intellectual, social, and
cultural incompetence and, in so doing, undercuts the capacities enabling
education. In the United States, the prototypical stigmatized trait is race;
the prototypical stigmatized group, African-Americans.
1. This Article focuses on racial stigma and will refer throughout to "stigmatized
minorities." By that I mean minority groups in the United States victimized by social stigma.
That class includes African-Americans. See infra Part III.B. 1. I also include Hispanic Americans
in my definition. To protect against monotony, I use the terms "minorities" and "racial
minorities" synonymously with "stigmatized minorities."
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While stigma, moreover, generally compromises the class-wide
educational fortunes of minorities, it affects individual children differently.
Children have varying abilities to defend themselves from stigmatic harm.
Some have access to familial or cultural resources shielding them from
internalizing stigma. Churches, community groups, and civic
organizations, for example, play a key role in minority communities in
combating the self-doubt engendered by stigma. Children, likewise, cope
variably with stigma. Some reflexively blame stigma for educational
insufficiency; others limit their educational potential to observed intra-
group accomplishment; and others, most insidiously, dis-identify with
educational achievement altogether.2 Although stigma affects racial
minorities collectively in ways that uniquely compromise education, it also
affects each child in diverse ways reflecting the breadth of their
experiences.
Because stigma undermines the educability of stigmatized minorities
as a class and individually, schools require the discretion to flexibly craft
services to address stigma's educational consequences. Across-the-board
policies un-targeted to specific stigmatic harms neglect racial minorities'
particular needs. Moreover, even uniform policies generally responsive to
stigma overlook the varied ways stigma obstructs the education of
individual children. In short, stigma specially burdens the education of
racial minorities, and schools, consequently, need the ability to adapt
services to these particular impediments.
Despite this need for flexibility, public schools, especially those
primarily serving stigmatized minorities, operate in a morass of mandates
that systematically remove discretion from school-based officials. Federal,
state, and central-office rules dictate uniform policies on matters spanning
the range of a school's responsibilities: the length of the school year, staff
tenure, choice of textbooks, how schools assess student achievement,
teacher certification, and pedagogical methodologies, to name a few.
Collective-bargaining rules--created by union contracts-pile on to the
already onerous statutory restrictions, and remove operational discretion in
the same way that government mandates undercut substantive discretion.
Union contracts, among other things, cap the number of successive and
total hours a teacher must teach; restrict the number of lesson plans a
teacher must prepare; limit teachers' participation in after-school programs;
and restrict administrative evaluation and discipline of staff. In urban
districts disproportionately serving stigmatized minorities, the rigidity of
2. See infra notes 129-132 and accompanying text.
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this cumulative body of rules is stark. As one analyst said, "a big city
[school] superintendent... operates in a straitjacket.",
3
This bureaucratic uniformity is not accidental, but is central to the
institutional conditions governing public schools. Public schools,
fundamentally, are government agencies-their priorities set, determined,
and regulated by political authorities. Political accountability, moreover, is
characterized by two foundational elements: democratic hierarchy and
political uncertainty. These elements impel rulemaking because the
removal of local discretion is vital both to the imposition of hierarchical
democratic values and to insulating current priorities from interference by
other government actors. Three additional public-school dynamics
exacerbate these bureaucratic tendencies: (1) the monopolistic nature of
public schooling; (2) large federal and state subsidy of public schools; and
(3) extraordinary public concern for school effectiveness. As discussed in
detail below, the absence of competitive pressure facilitates bureaucracy
because government regulation inevitably accompanies government money
and politicians generally respond to public pressure by implementing more
rules. These five factors instill a centralizing bureaucracy into the very
structure of public schools.
These dynamics, furthermore, apply with particular force to urban
districts disproportionately serving minorities. First, the functioning of
stigma suggests government is likely to impose on these districts special
rules reflecting diminished visions of minorities' capacity, such as
unchallenging curricular requirements and policies facilitating special-
education classification.4 Second, in urban districts led by minority
administrators, stigma induces greater bureaucracy given its messages
about minorities' competence. Democratic hierarchy generates
rulemaking, in part, to ensure subordinate officials appropriately implement
preferred policies. Stigma intensifies this tendency because it suggests
minority administrators lack the competence to do so. Third, because racial
minorities are relatively poor and under-perform academically-both of
which stem, in part, from stigma-the institutional dynamics specific to
public education affect urban schools disproportionately. Stigmatized
minorities are unlikely to have the resources necessary to exit public
schools or move to another district, and thus are especially vulnerable to
the way monopoly breeds rulemaking. Urban districts also depend
disproportionately on state and federal subsidy; these districts therefore are
uniquely constrained by the strings government inevitably attaches to
public funding. Finally, chronic under-performance, coupled with
3. See infra note 173 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 121-125, 227 and accompanying text.
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vulnerability to legal challenge, generates substantial political concern for
urban-district performance. This heightened scrutiny itself precipitates
even more regulation.
The institutional disposition toward uniformity is particularly
challenging for stigmatized minorities because of their political weakness.
Minorities' political limitations stem from their minority status, their lack
of wealth, and, most insidiously, stigma itself. Their minority status
ensures they cannot self-generate political outcomes at the state and federal
levels where educational policies increasingly are set. Additionally, their
lack of wealth undermines their political agency at all levels given the vital
role money plays in contemporary politics. Moreover, stigma impedes
their ability to align with other groups to facilitate political objectives.
These weaknesses preclude minorities from systematically influencing the
content of bureaucratic mandates. As such, the rules not only eliminate
discretion to flexibly adapt services to student needs, but also reflect
educational priorities that are neutral, if not hostile, to stigma's educational
consequences.
For these reasons, I argue that courts must upend the traditional way
they have approached remedies for stigmatized minorities showing public-
school inadequacy under state or federal constitutional law. Courts have
focused on public-school inputs, principally student-body integration,
school funding, and expert-approved remedial programs. Manipulating
these inputs, courts have ignored the institutional conditions governing how
schools use them, let alone whether those institutional conditions advance
the unique needs of stigmatized minorities.5 My critique argues that the
5. No court, based on my research, has ever considered the particular institutional critique I
offer here; nor has any court ordered the kind of class-wide institutional remedies I suggest. In
addition, virtually all legal commentators considering the breach of education rights focus on
public-school inputs, principally the three I mention. A few commentators do suggest school-
choice remedies. See, e.g., James E. Ryan, Sheff Segregation, and School Finance Litigation, 74
N.Y.U. L. REV. 529 (1999); Michael Heise, Equal Educational Opportunity and Constitutional
Theory: Preliminary Thoughts on the Role of School Choice and the Autonomy Principle 14 J.L.
& POL. 411 (1998); Joseph P. Viteritti, Choosing Equality: Religious Freedom and Educational
Opportunity Under Federalism, 15 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 113 (1996); Greg D. Andres,
Comment, Private School Voucher Remedies in Education Cases, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 795 (1995).
But these arguments are generally premised on the extent to which private schools provide an
immediately available supply of effective schools, not public schools' institutional limitations-
and surely not the relationship of these limitations to stigmatized minorities' particular
educational needs. Outside of the legal context, John Chubb and Terry Moe, in their
groundbreaking book POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1990) and James Q.
Wilson, in his classic BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WRY THEY DO
IT (Basic Books, Inc. 1989), offer structural critiques of the effect of politics on public-school
efficacy. These texts, however, do not address legal remedies and thus do not consider the
jurisprudential implications of an institutional account. Most importantly, these texts also do not
develop a critique in light of racial minorities' educational needs, let alone the effects of social
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institutional incentives governing public schools are incompatible with
these needs, and therefore requires courts to impose remedies that alter the
structural conditions governing decision-making. For racial minorities,
constitutional entitlements to effective education demand institutional
remedies.
Institutional remedies, however, are necessary but insufficient.
Flexibility is a necessity, but alone it can not guarantee adequate resources,
quality teaching, or challenging curricula, among other things. Courts
should continue to evaluate many of the inputs historically relevant, but do
so only after ensuring public schools' institutional conditions permit
needed flexibility. Because my principal purpose is to show the
incompatibility of public schools' institutional context with stigmatized
minorities' educational rights, I do not offer here a comprehensive remedial
account. The institutional critique by itself demonstrates the need for a
paradigm shift in the way courts approach remedies for minorities in
education cases; and that critique by itself covers significant conceptual
ground. I nonetheless outline preliminary thoughts on potentially
responsive remedies, suggesting that charter-school and private-choice
designs better vindicate the constitutional rights of racial minorities than
traditional remedies. In both of these models, publicly subsidized schools
have already used institutional flexibility-for example, modifying policies
on staff qualifications and hiring, pedagogical and curricular
methodologies, and the length of the school day and year-to effectively
adapt services to stigmatized minorities' specific needs.
6
Part I of this Article fleshes out the legal framework concerning
individual rights to effective-education services under state and federal
constitutional law. Part II discusses the ineffectiveness of traditional
inputs-based remedies in achieving systematically effective education for
minorities. Part III discusses the antithetical relationship between stigma
and effective education. It begins with a discussion of the cultural and
identity-forming character of education. In that context, Part III unpacks
the anatomy of stigma, focusing on the existential harms it produces and
the paradoxical relationship of these harms to educational achievement.
Part IV then discusses the highly bureaucratic character of public schools;
first describing the fact of dense bureaucracy and then arguing that such
rulemaking is central to public schools' institutional context. Finally, Part
stigma on these needs. These texts, consequently, ignore the fundamental contribution of this
article: the institutional inability of public schools to respond systematically to the educational
effects of stigma; and the correlative need for judicial remedies that alter the institutional
conditions governing public schools.
6. See infra notes 261-262 and accompanying text.
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V argues that courts must consider institutional remedies that re-design the
conditions governing policymaking, specifically offering charter-school
and private-choice designs as two alternatives.
I. State and Federal Constitutional Rights to Effective
Education Services
State constitutions, and to a lesser degree the federal Constitution,
require government to provide citizens either an adequate education, an
equal education, or both. Every state grants individuals a right to a publicly
provided education, generally through Education Clauses contained in the
state constitution.7 In virtually all states, this constitutional right has a
qualitative dimension: the education must be adequate to achieve state-
defined substantive outcomes, which generally involve preparing citizens
for competitive participation in the economy and inculcating in students
civic values . State constitutions also have equal-protection mandates,
requiring government to distribute education services equitably across
student populations. 9  These rights indirectly implicate adequacy
entitlements, as stark disparities in educational outputs might suggest
impermissible differences in state-provided inputs. In either event, through
adequacy or equal-protection imperatives, state constitutions entitle
individuals to qualitatively meaningful education services.
Although the federal Constitution does not directly entitle individuals
to education services,10 the Supreme Court held in Brown v. Board of
Education (Brown 1) that, if provided, the Equal Protection Clause requires
them to be "made available to all on equal terms."'1 1 Because all states, in
fact, do entitle individuals to education services, the federal Constitution
therefore places affirmative obligations on states to provide these services
7. See, e.g., James E. Ryan & Thomas Saunders, Foreword to Symposium on School
Finance Litigation: Emerging Trends of New Dead Ends?, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 463, 466
(2004); Molly McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses in School Finance Reform Litigation, 28
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 307, 311 (1991).
8. See, e.g., Paul A. Minorini & Stephen A. Sugarman, Educational Adequacy and the
Courts: The Promise and Problems of Moving to a New Paradigm, in EQUITY AND ADEQUACY
IN SCHOOL FINANCE: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 175, 190-99 (Helen F. Ladd et al. eds., 1999).
9. Id. at 182-83; Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance Litigation, and the
"Third Wave": From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1151, 1158 n.64 (1995); Ryan &
Saunders, supra note 7, at 466.
10. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 565-66 (1995) (recognizing limited
constitutional authority of federal government to directly regulate education policy). While the
federal government does not have the constitutional authority to directly compel states to provide
education services, it does induce states to adhere to federal education policy through its
Spending Clause power. See infra at Part IV.A (discussing federal regulation of school policy).
11. 347 U.S. 483,493 (1954).
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equitably. While Brown I and its progeny have focused primarily on
identifying racial segregation and correcting it through integration, the
Supreme Court in Milliken v. Bradley (Bradley 11) 12 interpreted Brown I to
permit, and sometimes require, educational-effectiveness remedies in de
facto segregated districts. Given "white flight" in the aftermath of Brown I,
and intervening decisions effectively prohibiting the inclusion of adjacent
districts in desegregation remedies, the integrationist dimension of Brown 1
is anemic. The availability of effective-education remedies is also limited
by recent decisions limiting these remedies to only those educational
deficiencies specifically attributable to segregation. Nonetheless, racial
minorities in de jure segregated districts retain viable, though limited,
federal claims to effective-education services.
This Part will summarize state and federal rights to adequate or equal
education services, describing the contours of a common, national right to
educational effectiveness. This constitutional right derives primarily from
state-law adequacy and equity guarantees. Federal law also permits
effectiveness remedies for districts subject to de jure segregation, but
these remedies are limited given the dwindling number of
desegregation decrees and the current difficulty of showing
intentional school segregation. After discussing state and federal
constitutional rights to educational effectiveness, Part II will discuss the
prevailing remedies used by courts to address violations of these rights.
A. Effective-Education Remedies Under State Law
All states have compulsory-attendance laws requiring children to
receive some sort of education. 13  States constitutions supplement these
privately binding mandates with public commitments obliging government
to make available educational services. 14  These public mandates,
moreover, generally require states to provide children with a particular kind
of education, primarily an education facilitating the development of those
competencies vital to social competitiveness and citizenship. 5 Such so-
12. 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
13. See, e.g., Adriana Lleras-Muney, Were Compulsory Attendance and Child Labor Laws
Effective? An Analysis From 1915 to 1939, 45 J.L. & ECON. 401, 403 (2002).
14. See, e.g., Heise, supra note 9, at 1158 n.64; McUsic, supra note 7, at 311; Ryan &
Saunders, supra note 7, at 466.
15. See, e.g., Thomas Corcoran & Margaret Goertz, The Governance of Public Education, in
INSTITUTIONS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 25, 25 (Susan Fuhrman &
Marvin Lazerson eds., 2005) (providing that the Founding Fathers, and specifically Thomas
Jefferson, advocated the creation of free "common schools" premised on teaching civic virtue and
financial self-sufficiency); see also FREDERICK M. HESS, COMMON SENSE SCHOOL REFORM 3-4
(2004). Federal courts likewise have recognized these dual substantive purposes of public
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called "adequacy" rights are designed, generally, to ensure that all children
receive a common baseline of educational services, even though wide
variance may exist in the kind and quality of services received beyond that
baseline. 16 State constitutions also prohibit the inequitable dispensation of
education services. 17 These equality rights generally prevent states from
distributing educational services on the basis of unreasonable
classifications. Equality norms are not specifically concerned with the
actual quality or effectiveness of the services delivered, although
substantive inefficacy-at least to the extent such inefficacy diverges
starkly from statewide baselines--often serves as a proxy for inequity.
These adequacy and equity mandates stimulated substantial litigation
in state courts after the Supreme Court's decision in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, which held that education is not
a fundamental right under the federal Constitution. 18 Prior to Rodriguez,
advocates pursued federal remedies to challenge stark inequities between
the educational resources available to racial minorities and those available
to Whites. These efforts sought to build on Brown I, which, as discussed
below, mandated school desegregation but did not specifically address
inequities in school funding. Commentators have described these federal
efforts as the "first wave" of school-finance litigation. 9 This "first wave"
of litigation ended with the rejection of federal school-funding relief in
Rodriguez. The infeasibility of federal remedies forced advocates to state
courts. As such, beginning in the early 1970s, state courts increasingly
became the venue of choice for funding-equity claims. This "second
wave" effort focused on state equality or adequate-education principles,
and sought to ensure an equitable distribution of resources.2 °
education. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 331 (2003) ( "We have repeatedly acknowledged
the overriding importance of preparing students for work and citizenship."); Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202, 221 (1982) (extolling "the pivotal role of education in sustaining our political and
cultural heritage" and providing the "basic tools by which individuals might lead economically
productive lives"); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979) ("The importance of public
echools in the preparation of individuals for participation as citizens, and in the preservation of te
values on which our society rests, long has been recognized by [this Court]."); Brown 1, 347 U.S.
at 493 (providing that education is "the very foundation of good citizenship").
16. See Minorini & Sugarman, supra note 8, at 188-89.
17. See, e.g., Heise, supra note 9 at 1158 n.63; Ryan & Saunders, supra note 7, at 466.
18. 411 U.S. 1, 18(1973).
19. See, e.g., Heise, supra note 9 at 1152-53; James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money,
109 YALE L.J. 249, 266 (1999); William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of
School Finance Litigation: The Massachusetts Decision As a Model, 35 B.C. L. REV. 597, 598
n.4 (1994).
20. Ryan, supra note 19, at 267-68.
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The current "third wave" of school-finance litigation seeks increased
funding to under-served schools, but these claims seek resources adequate
to enable constitutionally sufficient education, not resources equitably
allocated among districts.2' Thus, these claims do not limit the amount of
spending permitted by any individual district, but they do require that all
districts have sufficient resources to educate their students adequately.
States diverge in their substantive conceptions of what constitutes
constitutionally adequate education, but their visions generally require
them to develop citizens committed to civic values and prepared to
participate competitively in the economy.
In short, virtually every citizen in the country is constitutionally
entitled to education services. This entitlement, moreover, is generally
substantive, requiring states not simply to make services available but to
provide services sufficient to achieve favored objectives. These interests
form the basis of litigation over the past twenty years aimed at producing
effective education for stigmatized minorities. As discussed in Part II,
these efforts have fundamentally failed.
B. Effective-Education Remedies Under Brown v. Board of Education
1. The Demise of Integrationist Remedies Lays the Groundwork for
Compensatory-Education Remedies.
In addition to the state rights just discussed-which currently provide
the primary basis for effective-education claims-stigmatized minorities in
districts subject to de jure segregation also possess a qualified right to
effective-education services. The fount of education rights under the
federal Constitution is the Supreme Court's watershed decision in Brown
I-a decision whose morality not only fueled a myriad of social, cultural,
and political transformations, but also the philosophical underpinnings of
second and third-wave funding litigation under state law.22 In Brown I, the
Supreme Court held that legally segregated schools violated the Equal
Protection Clause because "in the field of public education[,] the doctrine
of 'separate but equal' has no place., 23 By rejecting the separate but equal
rationale, the Court abandoned its prior reasoning in Plessy v. Ferguson
that segregated facilities were permissible insofar as the implicated
21. See Minorini & Sugarman, supra note 8, at 188-89; Heise, supra note 9, at 1163.
22. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
23. Id. at 495. On the same day the Court decided Brown 1, addressing the Fourteenth
Amendment constitutionality of public-school segregation by state actors, the Court also decided
Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), concerning the Fifth Amendment constitutionality of
public-school segregation by federal actors.
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facilities were substantially equivalent.24  Relying on social-science
findings that school segregation generated "a feeling of inferiority" likely
to irrevocably affect the "hearts and minds" of minority children-and thus
encumber their educability-the Brown I Court concluded that segregation
was inherently unequal and therefore unconstitutional.25
In so doing, the Brown I Court found that state-sanctioned segregation
communicated messages to Whites and racial minorities alike about the
intellectual, cultural, and indeed ontological,26 status of minority children.
These stigmatic messages, in turn, generated psychological harms that
undermined education for Black children.27 According to the Court, these
harms violated equality principles because Black children suffered these
harms unilaterally. 28  While pre-Brown I precedent had revealed stark
resource disparities attendant to school segregation, 29 the Brown I Court did
not discuss the specific educational and developmental damage caused by
segregation. Instead, the Court focused exclusively on the psychological
injury to African-American children.
Although the Court in Brown I held that school segregation violated
the Equal Protection Clause, it did not consider remedies until deciding
Brown II, one year later.3° In Brown II, the Court ordered the defending
districts to admit "on a racially nondiscriminatory basis with all deliberate
24. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). Though Plessy involved segregated transportation services rather
than segregated public schools, it was the primary basis for justifying segregated schools
throughout the first half of the twentieth century. Thus, the Court's rejection of Plessy's
reasoning in Brown I, even if it did not necessarily mean that the Brown I and Plessy were
technically irreconcilable, is a vital element of Brown I-and indeed the element that precipitated
the subsequent collapse of the jurisprudential foundations supporting Jim Crow. See, e.g., Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down anti-miscegenation law based, in part, on morality
of Brown).
25. Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 494-95; see also id. at 494 (finding that segregation instilled in
Black children a "feeling of inferiority" that has a "tendency to (retard) educational and mental
development of [Black] children").
26. Ontology is the branch of philosophy concerning the taxonomy of existence; it describes
the kinds of things that exist and the categories into which they fit. See, e.g., THE OXFORD
COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 634-35 (Ted Honderich ed., 1995). I use this term to refer to the
way stigma challenges the essence of what kinds of beings the stigmatized constitute.
27. See Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 494.
28. See, e.g., IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE
183-90 (1996). Although the Court was preoccupied with the psychological harms experienced
by Black children, segregation also caused White children to suffer psychological injury.
Segregation distorted the existential standing of both Blacks and Whites, artificially suggesting
the inhumanity of the former and the superhumanity of the latter.
29. See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents., 332 U.S.
631 (1948).
30. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown fl), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
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speed the parties to these cases.",31 The invitation for delay implicit in the
"deliberate-speed" standard has been subject to substantial scholarly
criticism. 32  But the Court's exclusive focus on integrated student
assignment is perhaps a greater shortcoming. Brown Irs remedy does not
specifically address the stigmatic harms motivating Brown I: the degree to
which stigma so affected the self-perception of African-American children
that it undermined education. Rather, Brown 11 focuses on the race-neutral
admission of minority students to segregated schools.33 This approach, as
discussed below, would leave minorities without judicial recourse once
non-discriminatory pupil assignment had been achieved, even if such
policies left unaddressed the particular educational harms caused by
segregation and its stigmatic signals.
The companion Brown decisions stimulated predictable opposition
throughout both the North and South. In the immediate aftermath, many
state officials flatly rejected the decisions' legality and simply refused to
comply. 34  Consequently, little actual desegregation occurred in the first
decade following the Brown decisions.35 In the late 1960s and early 1970s,
the Supreme Court more vigorously enforced Brown II, admonishing that
the time for delay had ceased.36 These efforts produced substantial
desegregation in the South throughout the 1970s and 1980s,37 but progress
would prove fleeting. The more adamantly the Court enforced Brown II,
the faster Whites fled from cities into outlying suburbs, leaving inner-city
minority communities without sufficient numbers of White children to
make intra-district integration feasible.
38
31. Idat301.
32. See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Decade of School Desegregation: Progress and
Prospects, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 193, 196 (1964); Brian K. Landsberg, The Desegregated School
and the Retrogression Plan, 48 LA. L. REV. 789, 807 (1988).
33. Brown If, 349 U.S. at 301.
34. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 147-48 (5th ed. 2004);
see also Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 226 (1964) (describing the shutting down of all
schools in a county to avoid desegregation).
35. See, e.g., Swarm v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 13 (1971) ("[I]n
1968, very little progress had been made in many areas where dual school systems had
historically been maintained by operation of state laws.").
36. See, e.g., id at 18-20 (affirming judicial power to issue extraordinary remedies to
facilitate desegregation); Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968) ("The burden on a
school board today is to come forward with a [desegregation] plan that promises realistically to
work, and promises realistically to work now."); Griffin, 377 U.S. at 232, 234 ("The time for
mere 'deliberate speed' has run out.").
37. See, e.g., Lia B. Epperson, True Integration: Advancing Brown's Goal of Educational
Equity in the Wake of Grutter, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. 175, 182-83 (2002).
38. See, e.g., Estes v. Metro. Branches of the Dallas NAACP, 444 U.S. 437, 450 (1980)
(Powell, J., dissenting from dismissal of writ of certiorari) ("By acting against one-race schools,
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In response, some courts fashioned "metropolitan" desegregation
decrees, which corralled adjacent, majority-White suburban districts into
the ambit of Brown H remedies. These efforts, however, were short-lived.
In Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken 1), the Supreme Court held that
metropolitan remedies were impermissible outside the rare circumstance in
which the suburban district itself was complicit in the predicate Brown I
violation.39 Reasoning that the scope of remedies must correspond to the
scope of harm, the Court held that federal courts could only order
desegregation in those suburban districts that were culpable for the
underlying segregation. 40 The Milliken I Court thus distinguished between
de jure and de facto segregation, and held that judicial authority under
Brown H extended only to the former.
By prohibiting metropolitan remedies in the face of burgeoning white
flight, Milliken I represented, in many ways, the death knell of judicially-
compelled integration under Brown 11. Racially-isolated municipalities
simply did not have enough Whites to effectuate racial integration, and
Milliken I ensured that federal courts could not compel White suburban
communities to participate in desegregation remedies. In fact, as defacto
residential segregation increased over the last three decades, Milliken I
essentially ensured that public schools would become just as segregated as
residential neighborhoods.41  In the context of Milliken Is limitation on
metropolitan remedies, the Court subsequently considered, in the second
iteration of Milliken v. Bradley, whether compensatory education in de
facto segregated districts vindicated Brown T
courts may produce one-race school systems.... A desegregation plan without community
support, typically one with objectionable transportation requirements and continuing judicial
oversight, accelerates the exodus to the suburbs of families able to move.").
39. 418 U.S. 717, 744-45 (1974).
40. Id.
41. Today public schools are highly segregated; by some indicators, even more so than
during the desegregation era. See, e.g., ERICA FRANKENBERG ET. AL., THE CIVIL RIGHTS
PROJECT HARVARD UNIV., A MULTIRACIAL SOCIETY WITH SEGREGATED SCHOOLS: ARE WE
LOSING THE DREAM? 31 (2003) (providing that the percentage of White students in the school of
an average Black student was lower in 2000 than it was in 1970); Erwin Chemerinsky, Separate
and Unequal: American Public Education Today, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1461, 1461 (2003)
("Schools are more segregated today than they have been for decades, and segregation is rapidly
increasing."); Leland Ware, Race and Urban Space: Hypersegregated Housing Patterns and the
Failure of School Desegregation, 9 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 55, 55-56 (2002-2003) ("[T]he nation's
inner cities are more segregated today than they were 50 years ago.").
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2. The Availability of Compensatory-Education Remedies Under
Milliken II
In Milliken II, the City of Detroit, spumed in its efforts to pursue
integration through a metropolitan remedy, sought to vindicate Brown H
through compensatory education instead.42 Milliken H thus presented a
threshold question of whether substantive education remedies, in de facto
segregated districts, could relieve Brown I harms. The Milliken H Court
initially approached this question by affirming the basic purpose of Brown
//: "to restore victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they would
have occupied in the absence of such conduct. 43  The Court then
emphasized that the harm caused by segregation was not merely one of
racial alienation-that White students and minority students were isolated
from one another-but also one of educational subordination.44 The Court
specifically found that segregation caused educational damage to racial
minorities and that student assignment alone could not remedy that injury.
The Court reasoned that the consequences of discrimination still "linger[ed]
and c[ould] be dealt with only by independent measures., 45 Moreover, the
Court concluded that these independent measures were not discretionary,
but mandatory: "[t]he root condition [created by segregation] must be
treated directly by special training at the hands of teachers prepared for that
task."' 6
Finding that student assignment alone was insufficient to remedy the
harms caused by segregation, the Court affirmed the district court's order
requiring state support of compensatory programs designed to mitigate the
effects of prior segregation. These compensatory programs included
remedial reading programs, counseling and career-guidance services, and
in-service training for teachers.47 Linking these remedies to Brown I, the
Court found that these services were natural responses to the educational
and cultural harms caused by racial isolation.48 Integration alone did not
respond specifically to these substantive educational harms, and given the
42. Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 283, 286.
43. Id. at 280; see also Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971)
("The objective today remains to eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of state-imposed
segregation.").
44. Milliken I1, 433 U.S. at 287-88.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 288 (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 294.
48. Id. at 287 ("Children who have been ... educationally and culturally set apart from the
larger community will inevitably acquire habits of speech, conduct, and attitudes reflecting their
cultural isolation.").
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remedial obligations of Brown II, the Milliken H Court concluded that
compensatory education fell comfortably within federal courts' authority.
The logic of Milliken H suggested a broad, potentially
groundbreaking, re-conceptualization of Brown 11. By recognizing the
remedial necessity of relieving the substantive educational harms caused by
segregation, the Court specifically acknowledged that integrated student
assignment was insufficient. The Brown I Court held that stigma infected
the "hearts and minds" of Black children in a way that had a "tendency to
retard [their] educational and mental development. ' 49 By prohibiting state
sanctioned segregation, non-discriminatory student assignment might
alleviate the stigmatizing message of segregation (though of course not the
myriad of other ways society transmits stigma). But that remedy did not
specifically address the substantive educational harms caused by
segregation; those harms could be accommodated only by "independent"
measures "specially" tailored to stigmatized minorities' educational
needs.5° While the quality of education services afforded stigmatized
minorities is immaterial under Brown 11, it is paramount under Milliken 11.
After Milliken II, the Supreme Court did not meaningfully address
Brown I!-related questions again until deciding a trilogy of cases in the
early 1990s. These cases, which demonstrated the courts increasing fatigue
with federal micro-management of school policy, facilitated the dissolution
of Brown II consent decrees. 5' One of these cases, Missouri v. Jenkins,
limited the availability of Milliken H remedies by raising the predicate
evidentiary showing. Jenkins specifically provides that effective-education
relief under Milliken II is obtainable only if achievement deficiencies are
specifically attributable to segregation.52 Milliken I and the 1990s cases
thus represent a one-two punch to Brown II: the difficulty of showing
ongoing de jure segregation, coupled with Milliken I, diminishes Brown II
remedies; decisions easing the termination of Brown II decrees, coupled
with Jenkins's evidentiary burden, impedes Milliken II remedies.
49. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (original parenthesis
omitted).
50. Milliken 11, 433 U.S. at 287-88, 290. Moreover, even in districts with sufficient
diversity to make intra-district integration meaningful, compensatory-education remedies could-
and, according to Milliken 11, should--operate alongside integrationist practices.
51. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 99-102 (1995) (limiting use of magnet programs to
attract White students to adjacent districts); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 472 (1992)
(permitting piecemeal termination of discrete parts of desegregation decrees despite overall non-
compliance); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249-50 (1991) (holding that schools were
obligated to eliminate vestiges of segregation only to the extent "practicable").
52. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 101-102.
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In sum, state and federal constitutional law provide stigmatized
minorities effective-education interests. State constitutions, in general,
directly entitle minorities to an effective education. The U.S. Constitution,
in a diminishing number of districts, vindicates these interests indirectly
through Milliken II. Although state law provides the most viable vehicle
for vindicating stigmatized minorities' substantive education interests,
Milliken II, albeit anemic, remains alive. Stigmatized minorities therefore
have vindicable state and federal interests to effective education; and these
rights have been used over the last few decades to introduce substantial
amounts of new resources to schools serving stigmatized minorities. These
remedies have principally involved at least one of the following: racial
integration, enhanced school funding, and the provision of expert-approved
compensatory-education programs. As a rule, these approaches have been
ineffective. Large majorities of stigmatized minorities fail even to meet the
most basic proficiency standards. This fact is described in Part II.
II. The Systematic Failure of Traditional Remedies
Public schools systematically fail stigmatized minorities. 53 Only half
of African-American and Hispanic students graduate from high school;
54
and this statistic overstates graduation rates because minorities
disproportionately obtain diplomas through remedial exit programs. 55 This
is merely the tip of the iceberg. According to the National Assessment of
Education Progress ("NAEP"), racial minorities generally fail to meet even
basic proficiency standards. In five of the seven subjects tested on the
NAEP, solid majorities of Black twelfth-graders perform at a "Below
Basic" level-meaning they have failed to display even "partial mastery"
56of the skills needed for grade-level proficiency. Moreover, the average
Black or Hispanic twelfth-grader tests at the level of the average White
eighth-grader. In urban districts, which disproportionately serve
stigmatized minorities, the results are worse, revealing themselves earlier in
the educational process. In these districts, almost two-thirds of African-
American and Hispanic eighth-graders fail basic proficiency standards in
53. By systematic failure, I mean the routine, consistent output of public schools over time.
54. GARY ORFIELD ET. AL., THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT HARVARD UNIV., LOSING OUR
FUTURE: How MINORITY YOUTH ARE BEING LEFT BEHIND BY THE GRADUATION RATE CRISIS
87-88 (2004), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410936_LosingOurFuture.pdf.
55. See, e.g., Paul T. O'Neill, Special Education and High Stakes Testing for High School
Graduation: An Analysis of Current Law and Policy, 30 J.L. & Educ. 185, 211-219 (2001).
56. See, e.g., ABIGAIL THERNSTROM & STEPHAN THERNSTROM, NO EXCUSES: CLOSING
THE RACIAL GAP IN LEARNING 12-16 (2003).
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mathematics and over half fail in reading. 7 Building on these numbers,
only six percent of Blacks and Hispanics obtain a college degree.58 Even if
these results were new, they would still be tragic given the exigencies of a
modem economy dependent on intellectual rather than physical capital.
But these results are catastrophic given their durability.59 Public schools
simply fail stigmatized minorities.6 °
The stark insufficiency of these results motivated much of the
litigation described in Part I. In fashioning remedies to alleviate these
constitutional harms, courts have generally used at least one of three
approaches: (1) racial integration, (2) school finance, and (3) compensatory
education. Invariably, whether courts grounded these remedies in state or
federal rights, equity or adequacy claims, these remedies focused uniformly
on public-school inputs: the resources available to public schools rather
than the institutional conditions governing the use of resources.
Integration, for example, suggested effective education if schools contained
larger proportions of White students. School finance suggested the same
result if schools were adequately funded; and compensatory education did
so where schools contained expert-approved remedial program. However,
none of these traditional remedies accounted specifically for institutional
conditions. That failure inevitably constrains their effectiveness.
Integration has been the remedy of choice for federal courts enforcing
Brown. Brown I, as discussed, was premised on the educational harms
caused by stigma. The theory implicit in Brown H is that non-
discriminatory student assignment, by removing government sanction from
segregation, alleviates stigma and contributes significantly to improved
educational performance. This theory is questionable, both logically and
empirically. As a matter of logic, it strains credibility that the mere
presence of White students would substantially enhance student
57. See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., THE NATION'S REPORT CARD: TRIAL URBAN DISTRICT
ASSESSMENT, MATHEMATICS HIGHLIGHTS 10 (2003) available at http://nces.ed.gov/
nationsreportcard/pdf/dst2003/2004458.pdf.
58. Hillary Pennington, Accelerating Advancement in School and Work, in BROOKNGS
PAPER ON EDUCATION POLICY: 2003 339, 343 (Diane Ravitch ed. 2003), available at
http://muse.jhu.edu/joumals/brookingspapers on education-policy/v2003/2003. lpennington.pdf.
59. See, e.g., Kevin Brown, The Supreme Court 's Role in the Growing School Choice
Movement, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 37, 43-44 (2006).
60. See, e.g., Paul A. Minorini & Stephen A. Sugarman, School Finance Litigation in the
Name of Educational Equity: Its Evolution, Impact, and Future, in EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN
SCHOOL FINANCE: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note 8 at 65 (describing "widespread view
that the whole public schooling enterprise is inadequate, especially in its failure to educate
successfully too many of our urban poor children").
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performance. 61 The presence of White students, by itself, does not vitiate
the continued social transmission of racial stigma, respond to stigma's
psychological effects, or address the substantive educational harms caused
by segregation.62 In fact, given the educational harms triggered by
segregation and schools' current institutional limitations, Whites, at least in
the near term, are likely to out-perform stigmatized minorities. That
circumstance, when observed directly by stigmatized minorities, may
exacerbate notions about their lesser competence and thereby further
restrain educational performance. Empirical research, in any event,
confirms the dubiousness of a direct link between integration-in and of
itself-and educational achievement for stigmatized minorities: 63 the
61. See, e.g., Wendy Brown-Scott, Race Consciousness in Higher Education: Does "Sound
Educational Policy" Support the Continued Existence of Historically Black Colleges?, 43 Emory
L.J. 1, 44-45 (1994).
62. See, e.g., Alex M. Johnson Jr., Bid Whist, Tonk, and United States v. Fordice: Why
Integrationism Fails African-Americans Again, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1401, 1409 (1993)
("[I]ntegrationism has failed to help African-Americans achieve progress in this society."); Dora
W. Klein, Beyond Brown v. Board of Education: The Need to Remedy the Achievement Gap, 31
J.L. & EDUC. 431, 437, 456-57 (2002) ("Most desegregation cases decided under Brown,
however, are incapable of addressing the disparities that exist between the academic achievement
of black and white students.")..
63. See Jeffrey Prager et al., The Desegregation Situation, in SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
RESEARCH: NEW DIRECTIONS IN SITUATIONAL ANALYSIS 3, 6 (Jeffirey Prager et al. eds., 1986)
(providing that even where stigmatized minorities have performed better in desegregated settings,
it has not been shown that integration itself caused the improved performance); Russell W.
Rumberger & Gregory J. Palardy, Does Resegregation Matter?: The Social Composition on
Academic Achievement in Southern High Schools, in SCHOOL RESEGREGATION: MUST THE
SOUTH TURN BACK? 127, 137 (John Charles Boger & Gary Orfield eds., 2005) (providing that
the racial composition of a school does not predict student achievement); David J. Armor, The
End of School Segregation and the Achievement Gap, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 629, 631-38
(2001) (listing and rebutting prevailing claims on the link between desegregation and increased
racial-minority performance); see also Catherine E. Freeman et al., Racial Segregation in
Georgia Public Schools, 1994-2001: Trends, Causes, and Impact on Teacher Quality, in SCHOOL
RESEGREGATION: MUST THE SOUTH TURN BACK?, supra at 162 (concluding that there is no
direct evidence that segregation itself affects student performance, although predominately Black
schools tend to have fewer resources). Even strong supporters of integration's educational
efficacy have had difficulty isolating the educational benefits of compelled integration. Gary
Orfield, for example, claims that desegregation improves academic performance because it de-
concentrates poverty levels in de facto segregated districts, and improved socio-economic status
correlates to improved academic performance. See GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, THE CIVIL
RIGHTS PROJECT HARVARD UNIV., WHY SEGREGATION MATTERS: POVERTY AND
EDUCATIONAL INEQUALITY (2005), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/
research/deseg/WhySegregMatters.pdf; see also Epperson, supra note 37, at 197-99 (relying
primarily on circumstantial effects in claiming integration itself meaningfully enhances the
academic performance of African-American students). But this claim, even if true, fails to
establish racial integration as the reason for improved performance: socio-economic diversity, not
racial, is the predicate for these claims. See, e.g., John A. Powell, A New Theory ofIntegrated
Education: True Integration, in SCHOOL RESEGREGATION: MUST THE SOUTH TURN BACK?,
[Vol. 34.1
THE STRUCTURAL INADEQUACY OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS
benefits, at best, are indirect and limited. At any rate, as a factual matter,
integration has failed to produce systematically effective public-school
education for stigmatized minorities.
Moreover, integration as a remedial option fails because it is
politically and jurisprudentially infeasible. Politically, legislatures
seemingly have no meaningful interest in broad government efforts to
facilitate, let alone compel, public-school integration; and, from a litigation
standpoint, establishing intentional school segregation in modem times is
improbable. At the same time, Milliken I forecloses integrationist remedies
in majority-minority municipalities and the trilogy of 1990s cases eases the
termination of existing consent decrees. Today, integration is largely an
impractical option for improving educational outcomes for stigmatized
minorities.
While federal courts principally used integrationist remedies, state
courts, and those federal courts implementing Milliken II, primarily used
finance and compensatory-education remedies. These remedies, also, have
fundamentally failed. School-finance litigation, whether premised on
equity or adequacy, has precipitated significant increases in school funding,
particularly in poor, urban districts that disproportionately serve
stigmatized minorities.64 Yet, these finance remedies have not produced
consistent, systematic improvements in educational outcomes. The bald
fact remains that large majorities of stigmatized minorities, especially those
in urban districts primarily benefited by school-finance litigation, fail to
achieve even basic proficiency standards.65 Moreover, research findings
show that school-finance remedies have not produced sustained, systemic
improvements in student outcomes.66
supra at 285. It also bears emphasis that mere improvements, without more, do not meet the
systemic-effectiveness standard driving this Article.
64. See, e.g., William N. Evans et al., The Impact of Court-Mandates School Finance
Reform, in EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN SCHOOL FINANCE: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES, supra note
8, at 93 ("[T]he bulk of the evidence suggests that court-ordered reform has achieved its primary
goal of fundamentally restructuring school finance and generating a more equitable distribution of
resources."); Minorini & Sugarman, supra note 60 at 35; see also NAT'L ACCESS NETWORK,
SCHOOL FUNDING "ADEQUACY" DECISIONS SINCE 1989 (2006) available at
http://www.schoolfunding.info/litigation/adequacydecisions.pdf (showing that plaintiffs have
been successful in twenty of twenty-seven decided school-funding cases, and that decisions are
pending in another twelve states).
65. See supra notes 53-60and accompanying text.
66. Molly S. McUsic, The Law's Role in the Distribution of Education: The Promises and
Pitfalls of School Finance Litigation, in LAW AND SCHOOL REFORM: SIX STRATEGIES FOR
PROMOTING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY 88, 111 (Jay P. Heubert ed., 1999); see also Evans et al.,
supra note 64 at 91 ("[C]ourt-mandated school finance reforms do not significantly change either
the mean level or the distribution of student performance on standardized tests in reading and
mathematics."); id at 91-92 (discussing multiple empirical studies failing to show school-finance
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Compensatory-education remedies, whether premised under Milliken
H or state adequacy clauses, have also failed to produce systemic
improvements. Milliken II remedies, which are comparable to the
educational programs used by state courts in adequacy cases, have not
achieved substantial increases in stigmatized minorities' educational
performance.67 Programmatic remedies used by state courts in adequacy
suits have likewise been ineffective at generating sustained class-wide
educational improvement for minorities.68
The systemic ineffectiveness of integration, school finance, and
compensatory education does not mean that they have produced no
benefits-and could not, under appropriate conditions, produce
substantially more. Cultural diversity, leveraged appropriately, surely
enhances student learning; adequate resources, allocated wisely,
undoubtedly facilitate student learning; and remedial programs, well-
designed and responsive to particular student needs, likely improve the
performance of discrete student populations. But these approaches fail
specifically to address two predicate aspects of public education for racial
minorities: the operation of stigma, and institutional constraints on public
schools. Stigma, as discussed below in Part III, attacks the competencies
that enable education, and therefore presents a threshold challenge to
stigmatized minorities' educability. At the same time, public schools'
institutional constraints, discussed in Part IV, impede the flexibility
necessary to addressing the unique ways stigma affects racial minorities'
educability. Stigma coupled with public schools' institutional limitations
constrain the capacity of public schools to exploit integration, additional
resources, and compensatory education-or, for that matter, any other
input-in service of stigmatized minorities' educational needs. As
discussed in Part V, courts must use remedies that re-design the
institutional incentives governing public-school policymaking in order to
effectively meet the educational needs of stigmatized minorities.
remedies meaningfully improve stigmatized minorities' academic performance). See generally
JAY P. GREENE, EDUCATION MYTHS: WHAT SPECIAL INTEREST GROUPS WANT YOU TO
BELIEVE ABOUT OUR SCHOOLS-AND WHY IT ISN'T So 7-12 (2005) (discussing empirical
research generally showing that increased school funding has not produced meaningful increases
in student performance).
67. Susan E. Eaton et al., Still Separate/Still Unequal: The Limits of Milliken II's Monetary
Compensation to Segregated Schools, in DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL
OF BROWN V. BOARD OFEDUCATION 143 (Gary Orfield & Susan Eaton eds., 1997).
68. James Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 290-93 (1999). But see
Michael A. Rebell, Why Adequacy Lawsuits Matter, EDUC. WK., Aug. 11, 2004, at 40, available
at http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2004/08/11/44rebell.h23.html (arguing that some remedies
used by state courts finding adequacy violations have had favorable effects on student
performance).
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III. The Antithetical Relationship Between Education and
Stigma
This Part shows that educational attainment depends on the very
competencies inhibited by stigma. As discussed below, societies pursue
culturally desired philosophical objectives through education, and the
process of education itself-irrespective of the philosophical purposes
pursued-frames the way in which the educated view and imagine
themselves. At the same time, stigma challenges the existential status of
the stigmatized, imposing a social identity on them that challenges their
very humanity. As such, education and stigma cannot co-exist: stigma
corrodes the very competencies upon which effective education rests.
Moreover, stigma not only distinctively affects the educational prospects of
minorities as a group, but also has diverse effects on individual children
reflecting their familial, cultural, and social backgrounds. In this context,
this Part concludes that schools need flexibility to adapt educational
services to stigma's unique group and individual consequences.
A. Educational Philosophy Furthers Cultural Values, Assumes
Capacity, and Shapes Individual Identity.
Education is irreducibly cultural. Education policy reflects
philosophical judgments about the kinds of social outcomes, and indeed the
kinds of people that society deems desireable. 69 Educational philosophy, in
this respect, represents society's self-conception. The capacities and
competencies society inculcates in its children-and just as important,
those it does not-reveal a society's ultimate vision of itself. Educational
philosophy, therefore, is predicated on normative judgments about the very
kind of polity a society seeks to become. These normative judgments are
necessarily derived from cultural priorities, as there are no value-neutral
ways of determining educational philosophy. Similarly, the translation of
these first-order values into pedagogy and curriculum is likewise culturally
based.70  Because pedagogy and curriculum are designed to serve
69. See Richard Shaull, Foreword to PAULO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 16
(Myra Bergman Ramos trans., Continuum 1999) ("There is no such thing as a neutral educational
process. Education functions as either an instrument which is used to facilitate the integration of
the younger children into the logic of the present order and bring about conformity to it, or it
becomes the practice of freedom.") (internal quotations omitted); see also Jacques Derrida, Where
a Teaching Body Begins and How It Ends (Denise Egba-Kuehne trans.), in REVOLUTIONARY
PEDAGOGIES 83, 85 (Peter Pericles Trifonas, ed., 2000) ("There is no neutral or natural place in
teaching.").
70. See Henry A. Giroux, Postmodern Education and Disposable Youth, in
REVOLUTIONARY PEDAGOGIES, supra note 69, at 174, 177-78 ("[T]he overriding purpose of
schooling is, in large part, to prepare students to take their place in the corporate order.") (internal
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fundamental philosophical values, the cultured nature of the philosophy
necessarily informs the pedagogical and substantive means of achieving it.
Pedagogy and curriculum, moreover, are intrinsically informed by culture,
as the choice of teaching methodologies and substantive content themselves
presuppose value judgments about the appropriate ways of imparting
knowledge and the appropriate kinds of knowledge to impart.
71
In addition, the substantive content of educational philosophy assumes
students possess the capacity to achieve the philosophy's purposes.72 A
proportional relationship therefore exists between a society's judgments
about the existential standing of its students and the normative ambition
pursued in its educational philosophy. For example, a philosophy premised
on the development of critical-thinking skills presupposes that pupils
possess the capacity for such independent thinking. Conversely, a
determination that students in general, or some identifiable subset of
students, are incapable of achieving the kind of critical thinking a society
might otherwise desire induces less demanding philosophical objectives.
The substance of educational philosophy, and its presuppositions
about individual capacity, is particularly salient because education shapes
individual identity. Education instills in students society's social, cultural,
and political priorities and, in the process, structures the way in which the
educated imagine their possibilities.73 This result is inevitable given the
quotations omitted); see also Michael W. McConnell, Education Disestablishment: Why
Democratic Values Are Ill-Served by Democratic Control of Schooling, in MORAL AND
POLITICAL EDUCATION 104 (Stephen Macedo & Yael Tamir eds., 2002) ("Collective judgments
about the ideological and philosophical content of the curriculum must be made; dissenters must
either allow their children to be educated according to precepts they dispute or finance the
alternative from their own resources.").
71. See, e.g., Michael W. Apple, The Shock of the Real: Critical Pedagogies and Rightist
Reconstruction, in REVOLUTIONARY PEDAGOGIES, supra note 69, at 225, 226 ("[I]t is still clear
that no analysis of education can be fully serious without placing at its very core a sensitivity to
the ongoing struggles that constantly shape the terrain on which education operates.").
72. See JEROME BRUNER, THE CULTURE OF EDUCATION 46-47 (1996) ("Teaching, in a
word, is inevitably based on notions about the nature of the learner's mind. Beliefs and
assumptions about teaching, whether in a school or in any other context, are a direct reflection of
the beliefs and assumptions the teacher holds about the learner."); see also Gloria Ladson-
Billings, Who Will Survive America? Pedagogy as Cultural Preservation, in
POWER/KNOWLEDGE/PEDAGOGY: THE MEANING OF DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION IN UNSETTLING
TIMES 289, 294 (Dennis Carlson & Michael W. Apple eds., 1998) (providing that teachers'
believe about students' capacity often defines degree of student learning); Wendy D. Puriefoy,
The Education of Democratic Citizens: Citizen Mobilization and Public Education, in
INSTITUTIONS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra note 15, at 235, 249
(discussing extent to which predicate beliefs about student capacity define educational ambition).
73. See, e.g., Jaroslav Pelikan, General Introduction: The Public Schools as an Institution of
American Constitutional Democracy to INSTITUTIONS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: THE PUBLIC
SCHOOLS, supra note 15, at xiii, xviii ("Not only is character shaped by the dynamics of
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presuppositions about competency implicit in any educational philosophy.
Students are taught consistent with philosophical goals themselves
reflecting assumptions about their capacity. Thus, in almost circular
fashion, the predicate judgments motivating an educational philosophy
generate corresponding consequences for individual identity. It is in this
context that education theorists have concluded that children are not merely
taught in school, but are constructed.74
In sum, educational philosophy presupposes students possess the
capacity to achieve the philosophy's ambition. Educational philosophy,
simultaneously, encompasses normative judgments about those
competencies valued by a particular culture. At its core, educational
philosophy reflects cultural judgments about the purposes of education and
the capacity of students to achieve those purposes. Moreover, because
education necessarily shapes self-conception, student identity reflects those
assumptions about capacity implicit in any educational philosophy.
B. Stigma Undermines the Capacities Enabling Education.
Social stigma challenges the assumptions enabling prevailing
educational philosophies. As theorized by sociologist Erving Goffman,
stigma refers to a trait that is so deeply discrediting in the eyes of society
that those possessing it are viewed as less than human. 75 Stigma refers not
to a characteristic simply held in disrepute, but signifies a characteristic
perceived with such ignobility as to challenge the existential status of its
bearers.76 The challenge posed by stigma is stark:
The person bearing the [stigmatized] attribute is not only disliked
but socially dehumanized, a devalued individual whose ability to
participate as a full citizen in society is fundamentally
compromised by the negative meanings associated with his or her
[participation in a school community]; but both the image of the self and the understanding of
how a society functions .... ").
74. BRUCE GOLDBERG, WHY SCHOOLS FAIL 6 (1996). Education of course is not the sole
mechanism through which individual identities are shaped-undoubtedly family, religious, and
communitarian dynamics are also at work. But education is uniquely important in framing
identity.
75. See R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and Equality in Context, 79
N.Y.U. L. REv. 803, 817 (2004); see also ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE
MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 3 (First Touchstone ed., Simon & Schuster 1986) (1963)
("[The stigmatized individual] is thus reduced in our minds from a whole and usual person to a
tainted, discounted one."); see also Jennifer Crocker et al., Social Stigma, in 2 THE HANDBOOK
OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, (Gilbert et al. eds., 1998) 504, 504 ("Thus, the person who is
stigmatized is a person whose social identity, or membership in some social category, calls into
question his or her full humanity - the person is devalued, spoiled or flawed in the eyes of
others.").
76. See, e.g., GOFFMAN, supra note 75, at 3.
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[stigmatized] status. In essence, a . . . stigmatized person
becomes socially spoiled, dishonored, and reduced in our minds
from a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one.7 7
The stigmatized thus bear a characteristic that society perceives as
inconsistent with, if not antithetical to, prevailing conceptions of humanity.
The stigmatized are not merely perceived as different, or even alien; they
are regarded as occupying a qualitatively distinct existential plane.
While many kinds of stigmas operate at this level, I focus here on the
preeminent form of social stigma in the United States: racial stigma. This
is not because race is exclusively relevant, but because it is prototypically
relevant given its uniquely broad and longstanding legacy in this country.
While racial stigma has long been the subject of scholarly inquiry, recent
work by Glen Loury and R.A. Lenhardt, both building on Goffman, have
further clarified its meaning.79  Lenhardt's discussion is particularly
pertinent given her focus on stigma's legal implications.
1. A Short History of Racial Stigma in the United States
Racial stigma concerns the extent to which skin color-or more
precisely, in the American context, dark skin color-has been so
thoroughly dishonored as to unsettle the humanity of disfavored races.8°
The development and reification of racial stigma in this country is largely
attributable to the racial character of American slavery. Unlike many
versions of slavery practiced historically, American slavery was defined
principally by race.8' As such, blackness became the marker of slavery;
whiteness, by contrast, the sign of freedom. Owing to the racial pedigree
of American slavery, bondage was permanent: along with their physical
traits, Black children inherited a racial debt they had no capacity to repay.
77. Lenhardt, supra note 75, at 818 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
78. See, e.g., Nancy Cantor & Walter Mischel, Prototypes in Person Perception, in 12
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 3, 52 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., Academic Press
1979); GOFFMAN, supra note 75.
79. GLEN C. LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY (2002); Lenhardt, supra note
75.
80. See, e.g., Peter McLaren et al., Labeling Whiteness: Decentering Strategies of White
Racial Domination, in LABELING: PEDAGOGY AND POLITICS 203, 206-207 (Glenn M. Hudak &
Paul Kihn eds., 2001); JOHN P. JACKSON, JR. & NADINE M. WEIDMAN, RACE, RACISM AND
SCIENCE: SOCIAL IMPACT AND INTERACTION 21-22 (Rutgers Univ. Press, 2005).
81. See, e.g., JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. MOSS, JR., FROM SLAVERY TO
FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICANS 32 (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 7th ed. 1994); RACE,
RACISM AND SCIENCE: SOCIAL IMPACT AND INTERACTION, supra note 80, at 7 ("In fairly short
order in the New World blackness and slavery became associated. To be black was to be a slave
and to be a slave was to be black.").
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As such, racial stigma reconciled any perceived dissonance between
America's democratic rhetoric and slavery's dehumanizing reality.
Blackness signaled existential incompetence and thus undermined the very
premises underlying human claims to vindicable rights.82 In fact, racial
stigmatization was so complete that slavery was deemed not only logically
consistent with liberal democratic values, but even a moral obligation. The
assessment of an authority no less than the United States Supreme Court is
illustrative:
[Black people] had [long] been regarded as beings of an inferior
order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either
in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no
rights which the white man was bound to respect; and that the
negro might be justly and lawfully reduced to slavery for his
benefit. He was bought and sold, and treated as an ordinary
article of merchandise and traffic, whenever a profit could be
made by it. This opinion was.., regarded as an axiom in morals
as well as in politics, which no one thought of disputing, or
supposed to be open to dispute; and men in every grade and
position in society daily and habitually acted upon it in their
private pursuits, as well as in matters of public concern, without
doubting for a moment the correctness of this opinion.83
The Dred Scott analysis is a textbook description of stigma's anatomy.
Black people were not regarded as fundamentally human, but were
"beings" of a qualitatively distinct and "inferior order."84 The disconnect
between White humanity and Black inhumanity was plain: Blacks "had no
rights which the white man was bound to respect" and, as such, could "be
justly and lawfully reduced to slavery for [their] benefit. 85 But what is
perhaps most illuminating is stigma's reflexivity. The defamed character
of Black people was axiomatic, a foundational truism defining prevailing
thinking about the world. The stigmatized status of Blackness was a social
fact. As such, Americans reacted to it habitually, just as they did the laws
of gravity.
Racial stigma, moreover, was both a cause and an effect of slavery.
While pre-existing disparaging notions of Black humanity fueled slavery,
the institution itself fortified racial stigma. As discussed by Orlando
Patterson, slavery represented the "permanent, violent domination" and
82. See generally HADLEY ARKES, NATURAL RIGHTS AND THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE 72-86
(2002) (theorizing that rights claims depend on the existential status of putative rights-bearers).
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dishonoring of slaves' personhood.86 Slavery did not represent simply an
exploitive labor relationship; slavery embodied a social and cultural caste
privileging the master over the slave.87 Glen Loury, further explained that
"[t]his [was] a parasitic relationship within the social body: [m]asters
derive honor from their virtually unlimited power over slaves, who are
radically marginalized because their very social existence is wholly
dependent on relations with their masters. 88  Intrinsic to slavery is the
social honoring of the master, the dishonoring of the slave, and the
reification of that hierarchy through culture and custom. Slavery is
inherently stigmatizing. And because American slavery was defined in
racial terms, the stigma of slavery and the stigma of race operated
interdependently.89
In addition, from the inception of the American experience, racial
stigma was entrenched in the very ordering of society. One quarter of
America's population was defined by stigma while the social identity of
Whites was correspondingly defined and distorted as well. 90 Because
slavery played a primary role in the country's social, cultural, economic,
and political life, racial stigma was embedded in the foundation of
American democracy.
Given its entrenched character, it is unsurprising that the legacy of
racial stigma outlived slavery's formal demise. Stigma was the predicate
for de jure and defacto segregation throughout the nation.91 For almost a
century after the end of slavery, racial stigma continued to fuel legal and
extralegal measures restricting the existential possibilities of Black
Americans. 92 The civil-rights movement was fought primarily to uproot
the continued legacy of White supremacy and its legal and institutional
concomitants. While civil-rights successes led to the removal of many
formal barriers to equal opportunity, the underlying fact of White
supremacy and racial stigma-though no longer granted explicit, public
86. ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 13
(1982).
87. Id. at 5.
88. LOURY, supra note 79, at 68-69; see also PATTERSON, supra note 86, at 96 ("What was
real was the sense of honor held by the master, its denial to the slave, its enhancement through the
degradation of the slave, and possibly the slave's own feeling of being dishonored and
degraded.").
89. LOURY, supra note 79, at 69.
90. See e.g., Crocker et al., supra note 75 at 508-09.
91. See, e.g., Eugene C. Holmes, A Philosophical Approach to the Study of Minority
Problems, 38 J. OF NEGRO EDUC. 196, 199-200 (1969).
92. See generally LEON F. LITWACK, TROUBLE IN MIND: BLACK SOUTHERNERS IN THE AGE
OF JIM CROW (1998).
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sanction-continue to encumber social interactions and the status of Black
Americans and others.93
2. The Cognitive Dimension of Racial Stigma
The continued salience of racial stigma is due not only to the
entrenched character of explicitly racialized thinking in American society,
but also the cognitive functioning of stigma. Longstanding social science
reveals that human beings seek to classify information and attach meaning
to classifications on the basis of visible clues.94  Human beings crave
information with which to rationalize and contextualize their social
interactions, and physical characteristics provide readily available grounds
for classification.95 These classifications seek to reconcile new information
with pre-existing scripts, which themselves comprise composites of prior
experiences with and cultural understandings about that information.
Classifications, whether informed by physical or other characteristics, are
thus means by which individuals regularize social relations. As such,
classification is one of the most basic forms of human cognition.
96
Importantly, classification represents a cognitive rather than a
purposeful act.97  Classificatory cognition simply describes the way
individuals think about the world and the information they encounter.98 It
is not predicated on conscious value judgments about the ideal constitution
of things. 99 In fact, individuals might wish that matters differed from the
implications of their classifications, but their capacity to conceptualize such
93. See, e.g., Crocker, supra note 75 at 511 ("Most children in the United States learn as
early as the age of three years to devalue people with dark skin color."); Christopher A. Bracey,
Dignity in Race Jurisprudence, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 669, 692 (2005) (discussing current
implications of stigma-informed thought rooted in slavery and Jim Crow).
94. LOURY, supra note 79 at 17 ("Information-hungry human agents-in making pragmatic
judgments, to be sure, but also as a necessity for survival-will notice visible, physical traits
presented by those whom they encounter in society: their skin color, hair texture, facial bone
structure, and so forth.").
95. Id.
96. Id.; see, e.g., David L. Hamilton & Tina K. Trolier, Stereotypes and Stereotyping: An
Overview of the Cognitive Approach, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 127, 128
(John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986); see also Crocker et al. supra note 75 at 508
("Social stigma is ubiquitous. In every society, some individuals are stigmatized.");.
97. LOURY, supra note 79 at 17; Tristin Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics:
Toward a Structural Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91,
96-98 (2003).
98. See, e.g., Crocker et al., supra note 75 at 511 (providing that stigma-based stereotypes
often "are held so widely that they are identified not as stereotypes, but as 'facts."').
99. See, e.g., id.
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a different world is undermined by the strength of their cognitions.'
00
Cognition thus refers to the meaning individuals give the information they
encounter; it is a form of translation by which the human mind converts the
foreign into the ordinary.' 0 ' In short, this kind of cognition is unthinking:
individuals perfunctorily reach the classifications by which they understand
their social interactions.1
0 2
At the same time, the values individuals ascribe to these reflexively
drawn classifications derive largely from socially transmitted signals.'
0 3
Human beings do not operate in a contextual vacuum; they are socialized
into a cultural and historical context. The American context is one
challenged by a long history of stigma-informed racialized thinking, and
that context provides the ethos in which individuals cognitively encounter
each other.1°4 While the most virulent manifestations of this ethos have
been tempered by legal prohibitions on explicit racial subordination, these
formal remedies cannot eliminate the longstanding, pejorative social and
cultural meanings produced by racial stigma.'0 5 This social setting frames
100. See id at 511-12 (providing that pervasive stereotypes "may be so familiar, and so
overlearned because of repeated exposure, that they can be easily, perhaps even automatically
accessed, even by people who do not consciously endorse or agree with them").
101. See, e.g., LOURY, supra note 79 at 17-18 ("One of the ways that we generate and store
social information is to classify the persons we encounter ... so we can better know what it is to
be expected from those with whom we must deal, but about whom all too little can be
discerned."); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 337 (1987) ("All humans tend to categorize in order
to make sense of experience. Too many events occur daily for us to deal successfully with each
one on an individual basis; we must categorize in order to cope.").
102. See Crocker et al., supra note 75, at 512, 515; GOFFMAN, supra note 75, at 2 (noting that
the social identity attributed to the stigmatized is often not even conscious to the perceiver until
there is an active question as to whether that identity will be realized); S.L. Gaertner & J.F.
Dovidio, The Aversive Form of Racism, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM, supra
note 96, at 62 (providing that given the extent to which racial stereotypes and attitudes inform
socialization, individuals of all races, including African-Americans themselves, "almost
unavoidably possess negative feelings and beliefs about Blacks"); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The
Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment
Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1216-17 (1995) (arguing that social cognition theory
teaches that "intergroup discrimination" is both unintentional and unconscious. It occurs
spontaneously as an unwanted artifact of normal cognitive functions and can be corrected, if at
all, only through further deliberate mental effort).
103. See Lenhardt, supra note 75, at 827 ("As common as the tendency to label or categorize
is, however, how we come to value or devalue things-in this case racial difference-is generally
not a 'natural' or internally driven phenomenon. The meaning we attach to particular categories
largely comes from external sources. That is, the social and historical context in which we find
ourselves largely accounts for the value systems we employ at an individual level in categorizing
difference.").
104. See, e.g., id. at 826-28.
105. See, e.g., LOURY, supra note 79, at 69.
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individual cognitive interactions and thus precipitates racialized thinking
and associations even when an individually is normatively opposed to such
thinking. 10 6  In these ways, racial stigma operates at a cognitive level
beyond an individual's conscious understanding of their racial thinking.
3. Racial Stigma Generates Ontological Harm.
Racial stigma injures the stigmatized in several ways. Most pertinent
are stigma's ontological harms: the extent to which stigma challenges
minorities' basic existential status. As recently summarized by Professor
Lenhardt, racial stigma causes two kinds of ontological harm most relevant
here: first, once internalized, it compromises self-regard and, second, it
generates an uncertain social identity. In challenging minorities' most
basic human capacities, these injuries undermine minorities' intellectual,
cultural, and social standing. In so doing, these harms also impede the
ability of stigmatized minorities to participate fully in society's civic,
cultural, and political life. 10 7 Such "citizenship harms," using Lenhardt's
terminology,'0 8 are inevitable. Stigma distinctly marks its targets as less
than human and that social signal necessarily affects the way in which
others perceive and engage them. 09 These harms, moreover, not only
affect the stigmatized, as a class, in ways that distinguish them from others,
but also produce varying effects in individuals.
The internalization of stigma's challenge to existential capacity is
perhaps stigma's most debilitating consequence."0 When internalized, the
stigmatized accept stigma's messages about their inferiority."' Moreover,
106. Crocker et al., supra note 75, at 512, 515; see Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 102, at 62
(providing that, given the extent to which racial stereotypes and attitudes inform socialization,
individuals of all races "almost unavoidably possess negative feelings and beliefs about Blacks").
107. Lenhardt, supra note 75, at 836, 839-43.
108. Id. at 812.
109. See, e.g., Crocker et al., supra note 75, at 511.
110. See, e.g., Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM:
EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 26 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994) (providing that
internalized stigma, what Taylor terms misrecognition, "can inflict a grievous wound, saddling its
victims with a crippling self-hatred. Due recognition is not just a courtesy we owe people. It is a
vital human need."); see also Crocker et al., supra note 75, at 511-12 (discussing internalization
of stigma); Theresa Perry, Achieving in Post-Civil Rights America: The Outline of a Theory, in
YOUNG GIFTED, AND BLACK: PROMOTNG HIGH ACHIEVEMENT AMONG AFRICAN-AMERICAN
STUDENTS 87, 105 (Theresa Perry et al. eds., 2003) (discussing challenges of internalized stigma
for African-Americans).
111. See Hamilton & Trolier, supra note 96, at 150 (discussing "self-fulfilling" feedback
effects of stigma); see also LOURY supra note 79, at 26-27 (outlines the logic of self-confirming
stereotypes: first, "rational statistical inference in the presence of limited information," second,
"feedback effects on the behavior of the individuals" due to the expectation that such inferences
will be made about them and third, "mutually confirming beliefs and behaviors"); Crocker et al.,
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the cognitive acceptance of one's own insufficiency generates conduct
reflective of that self-perception. This triggers a vicious cycle where
stigma's rationality is reinforced, fueling stigma's continued propagation.
Ontological harm is thus both a cause and an effect of stigma: stigma
injures the stigmatized by signaling their existential insufficiency, and that
insufficiency, once internalized, precipitates conduct that itself sustains
stigmatization. As such, internalized stigma is uniquely incapacitating. It
causes the stigmatized to believe in and identify with their own inferiority,
and thus undermines the capacities vital to defending against stigma.
In addition, stigma also threatens a social schizophrenia concerning
racial minorities' identity. Goffman explained that stigma imposes a
"virtual social identity," comprised of the characteristics society attributes
to and expects of the stigmatized. 12 This virtual identity contrasts with an
individual's actual identity-the range of attributes actually possessed by
that individual. Because of this dissonance, the stigmatized are in a
constant struggle to reconcile their virtual and actual selves. 1 3 Similar to
internalized stigma, this injury causes the stigmatized to be uncertain about
their capacity and thus their intellectual, social, and cultural standing.
Significantly, while these harms generally describe the injuries
produced by stigma, the way stigma actually affects individuals varies.
First, the stigmatized do not simply suffer stigmatic injury passively.
Aware of the destructive consequences of diminished social notions of
minority capacity, many families affirmatively seek to instill in their
children the sense of self-worth vital to defending against stigmatic
injury. 114  Cultural and social institutions also play a critical role.
supra note 75, at 536 (discussing self-fulfilling relationship of stigma and poor academic
performance for African-Americans).
112. GOFFMAN, supra note 75, at 2; Lenhardt, supra note 75, at 818; see also LOURY, supra
note 79, at 64-65, (providing that the virtual identity can subsume actual identity given the
significance attributed to race; the observer may lose the incentive to discern actual identity
believing that that members of racial groups are homogenous).
113. Long before sociologists developed the concept of stigma, W.E.B. DuBois offered what
remains, perhaps, the most incisive analysis to date of this struggle:
It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at
one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world
that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One ever feels his two-ness,-an American,
a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one
dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder.
W.E.B. DU Bois, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 2 (Kessinger Publ'g 2004) (1903).
114. See, e.g., LAWRENCE OTIS GRAHAM, OUR KIND OF PEOPLE: INSIDE AMERICA'S BLACK
UPPER CLASS (2000); Brown-Scott, supra note 61, at 10-12; Cheryl L. Wade, When Judges are
Gatekeepers, Democracy, Morality, Status, and Empathy in Duty Decisions (Help From Ordinary
Citizens), 80 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 32-33 (1996) (discussing role of"churches, fraternities, sororities,
community centers, and other social organizations" in promoting esteem and educational
achievement).
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Churches, civic groups, community organizations, professional
associations, local newspapers and radio, particularly in the African-
American community, have a long history of specifically inculcating in
children personal self-esteem and cultural pride.' 15 The degree to which
individuals have access to and avail themselves of these resources, as well
as the degree to which these resources are effective in mitigating stigma's
effects, are highly variable.
Individuals, moreover, also cope differently with stigma. Some
reflexively attribute negative outcomes to prejudice in ways that often
overstate stigma's actual influence.' 16 Others limit their social interactions
only to members. of stigmatized groups--deeming relationships across the
stigma line too psychologically dangerous.' 17  Others simply disengage
from the activity in which stigma presents itself, essentially finding stigma
too distorting to the integrity of the implicated activity to justify continued
commitment.'18  These categories merely illustrate a range of individual
responses to stigma. While stigma affects the stigmatized as a class in
ways that distinguish them from others, it simultaneously affects
individuals differently in light of familial, cultural, and social background.
4. Stigmatic Harm Undermines Education.
Stigma undermines educational achievement. Like stigmatic harm
generally, stigma affects educability both internally and externally.
Internalized stigma uniquely damages identity and self-esteem. Stigma
challenges the existential status of its victims and, once internalized, leads
them to identify with their own incapacity. Such internalized stigma is
intensely harmful to education. Jean Aronson's findings are illustrative:
"The beliefs that children create and develop and hold to be true about
themselves are vital forces in their success or failure in all endeavors, and
of particular relevance ... their success or failure in school."' 19 When the
115. See, e.g., GRAHAM, supra note 114; C. ERIC LINCOLN & LAWRENCE H. MAMIYA, THE
BLACK CHURCH IN AFRICAN-AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 1-20 (1990); Brown-Scott, supra note 61,
at 10-12; Wade, supra note 114, at 32-33.
116. See Crocker et al., supra note 75, at 521.
117. Seeid.
118. See id.
119. Frank Paiares & Dale H. Schunk, Self and Self-Belief in Psychology and Education: A
Historical Perspective, in IMPROVING ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENT: IMPACT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL
FACTORS ON EDUCATION 3 (Joshua Aronson ed., 1999); see also JOSEPH RAz, ETHICS IN THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS 178-79 (Oxford University
Press 1996) (1994) ("[O]ne's culture constitutes (contributes to) one's identity. Therefore
slighting one's culture, persecuting it, holding it up for ridicule, slighting its value, etc., affect
members of that group ... particularly... if it has the imprimatur of one's state."); CARTER G.
WOODSON, THE MISEDUCATION OF THE NEGRO 84 (African Am. Images 2000) ("If you make a
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stigmatized doubt their capacity, educational under-performance is self-
fulfilling. 12 ° Because of this internalized stigma, it is unsurprising that
many young African-Americans, for example, regard educational success
as a form of "acting white;" stigma has so thoroughly discredited their self-
perception that educational achievement is perceived as a foreign pursuit.'
21
In addition to the acute and potentially irremediable damage to
educational capacity caused by internalized stigma, external forms of
stigma-influenced conduct also undermine minorities' educability. This
results not only from the stigma-informed prejudice-both conscious and
cognitive-inhabiting individual members of the school community, but
also the way in which stigma-informed thought influences institutional
conduct. 22 At a threshold level, public schools simply expect and demand
less of minority children. 123  These diminished expectations reflect
stigmatized notions of student capacity. This general ethos of diminished
expectation is evident in a range of school contexts, but is particularly
discernible in curricular requirements, 2
4 student tracking, 125 discipline, 126
man feel that he is inferior, you do not have to compel him to seek inferior status, for he will seek
it for himself.").
120. See, e.g., Crocker et al., supra note 75, at 538; see also Claude Steele, Stereotype Threat
and African American Student Achievement, in YOUNG GIFTED, AND BLACK: PROMOTING HIGH
ACHIEVEMENT AMONG AFRICAN-AMERICAN STUDENTS, supra note 110, at 111, 116-20
(discussing specific effects of "stereotype threat" on stigmatized minorities' educational
performance); Jason W. Osborne, Race and Academic Disidentification, 89 J. OF EDUC.
PSYCHOL. 728, 732 (1997) (discussing results of studies indicating educational impediments
posed by internalized stigma).
121. See, e.g., Crocker et al., supra note 75, at 529-30, 535 (discussing extent to which stigma
causes Black students to associate educational success with Whites); see also Osborne, supra note
120, at 732 (1997) (demonstrating empirical date that stigma causes Black students to dis-identify
with educational achievement).
122. See, e.g., Crocker et al., supra note 75, at 535 ("[D]evaluation of the stigmatized in
school can also take a more 'climatic' form. Prejudice and stereotypes can be held very weakly,
even resisted by individuals in a collective (e.g. a school), yet through their coordination of the
entire collective's behavior toward the stereotyped group, they can profoundly affect its
experience.").
123. See, e.g., Martin Haberman, Urban Eduation: The State of Urban Schooling at the Start
of the 21st Century, EDNEWS, Nov. 1, 2004, available http://www.ednews.org/articles/591/l/
URBAN-EDUCATION-THE-STATE-OF-URBAN-SCHOOLING-AT-THE-START-OF-THE-
21 -ST-CENTURY/Page 1 .html
("[I]n the urban districts serving culturally diverse students in poverty, these broad [educational]
missions are frequently narrowed down to 'getting a job and staying out of jail."').
124. See, e.g., JEAN ANYON, GHETTO SCHOOLING: A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF URBAN
EDUCATIONAL REFORM 9-12 (1997) (citing research showing that "instruction in inner city
schools is often based on cognitively low-level, unchallenging, rote material."); JONATHAN
KozOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 75-76 (1990) (providing
that book-keeping and cosmetology classes often replace math courses in inner-city schools); R.
Edmunds, Effective Education for Minority Pupils: Brown Confounded or Confused, in SHADES
OF BROWN: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 109 (D. Bell ed. 1980) (discussing
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and special-education referral and classification. 127  Discriminatory
treatment in each of these areas is inextricably linked to the ontological
consequences of stigma.
These internal and external harms are exacerbated by the antithesis
between the identity-forming character of education and the identity-
damaging character of stigma. Because stigma imposes a spoiled "virtual
social identity," the stigmatized must develop identities independent of
those engendered by stigma in order to protect their self-regard. This
requires the stigmatized to develop means of affirming actual identities and
disclaiming stigma-derived virtual identities. Education is inextricably
linked to this struggle because education itself generates identity. But
when education reinforces stigma, the stigmatized are doubly injured.
They are not only distanced from the tools enabling a robust defense
against stigma, but they are also affirmatively instructed in such a way that
reinforces the very ontological harms requiring remedy.
Finally, although these harms affect the stigmatized, as a class, in
ways that distinctly impede education, they also affect individual children
differently. As discussed above, children have varying levels of access to
familial, social, and cultural resources that help contradict stigma. These
resources counter stigma's pejorative messages with correspondingly
affirmative ones. Depending on the availability and quality of these
resources, children will be differently affected by stigma's educational
costs. Those with the weakest defenses are more likely to bear the full
brunt of stigma's negative educational effects. Conversely, those with the
strongest defenses are less likely to internalize stigma's ontological
ways that low curricular and teacher expectations impede academic performance of Black
students).
125. The discriminatory tracking of Black students into remedial classes, and the
corresponding tracking away from advanced classes, reflects stigmatized cognitions of the
intellectual and academic potential of Black students. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 59, at 47-48.
126. Racially discriminatory discipline reflects notions that the stigmatized are predisposed to
behaviors inconsistent with social norms. Different punishments for comparable infractions
suggest that breaches committed by the stigmatized are more dangerous than others. See, e.g.,
ADVANCEMENT PROJECT & HARVARD CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, OPPORTUNITIES SUSPENDED:
THE DEVASTATING CONSEQUENCES OF ZERO TOLERANCE AND SCHOOL DISCIPLINE, vi-iX
(2000) available at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/discipline/
exec summary.pdf.
127. Discriminatory special-education referrals and classifications especially illustrate
stigma's ontological challenge. Special-education classification signals disabilities inhibiting
children from advancing educationally to the same degree as others. This corresponds to stigma's
signal about minorities' capacity. See, e.g., HARVARD CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, RACIAL
INEQUITY IN SPECIAL EDUCATION, (June 2002), available at
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/specialed/IDEA_paper02.php (showing
African-Americans are up to four times more likely to be classification as mentally retarded or
emotionally disturbed).
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consequences and are more likely to succeed educationally. In fact, some
children not only believe self-assuredly in their own capacity-a radical act
in a stigmatized environment-but also believe they have the ability, by
dint of their own extraordinary achievement, to negate the predicate
supporting stigma.
In addition to their varying levels of access to resources that help
defend against stigma, children also cope differently with stigma. For
example, some children shirk personal responsibility for failure and
automatically blame prejudice for their undesirable educational
outcomes. 128 This knee-jerk disavowal of culpability, motivated by a
perception that stigma inevitably corrupts performance evaluation,
undermines the motivation to achieve that is indispensable to educational
performance. Other children might define their educational potential
strictly by standards gleaned from intra-group observation. Such
artificially narrow benchmarks are especially problematic in
disproportionately segregated and poor urban districts. In these
communities, as described above, only a minority of students even graduate
from high school and only a small subset of them attend, much less
graduate from, post-secondary schools. This predicate provides minorities
little reason to believe ambitiously in their own potential. The synthetically
low standards of some stigmatized children reinforce stigma's messages
about their capacity.
Perhaps most insidious, some children dis-identify with educational
achievement altogether. Such disassociation might result, as suggested
above, from an internal sense of incapacity to perform educationally. But it
might also result from a perception that stigma has stripped schooling of
integrity. Some stigmatized children detach themselves entirely from
education: the dropout option. While others remain in school but dismiss
its value: the under-achiever option. A recent study, for example, showed
that Black twelfth-graders correlated educational performance with their
self-esteem at significantly lower rates than their White peers. 129 When
stigma triggers disassociation, the consequences could not be more
damaging: the stigmatized either leave the educational system entirely or
marginalize its relevance to their future. Like excessive prejudice-blaming
and artificial intra-group comparison, dis-identification and stigma are
mutually reinforcing. Disassociation produces the very educational failures
that fuel stigma.
These represent a range of individual responses to stigma, which vary
depending on a child's age and socio-economic status. Coping responses,
128. Crocker et al., supra note 75, at 521.
129. Osborne, supra note 120, at 732.
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additionally, are fluid and overlapping, both with one another and the
quality of a child's capacity-affirming defenses. Stigma, in short, harms
the stigmatized collectively in ways that uniquely obstruct their education.
But just as important, it affects individual children in varied ways reflecting
the diversity of their experiences.
For these reasons, schools need the flexibility to respond to the unique
class and individual ways stigma impedes education. Public schools'
structural constraints, however, negate this flexibility. As discussed below,
public schools, particularly those serving stigmatized minorities, are
characterized by a bureaucratic uniformity in which across-the-board rules
remove school-based discretion to tailor services to student needs. At best,
this neglect perpetuates those existential harms undermining education; at
worst, by failing to specifically account for and mitigate these harms, it
exacerbates them. In either event, these institutional limitations preempt
the responsiveness necessary to effectively serve the unique educational
needs of stigmatized minorities.
IV. The Institutional Limitations on Public Schools' Ability to
Effectively Serve Stigmatized Minorities' Educational Needs
A stifling web of mandates governs public schools and effectively
removes discretion from local officials to chart schools' philosophic,
curricular, and pedagogic direction. This bureaucracy is not coincidental.
It is intrinsic to political authority and thus intrinsic to traditional public
schools-particularly urban schools disproportionately serving stigmatized
minorities. This uniformity denies the flexibility needed to respond both to
the distinctive class-wide and individual needs of minorities. The problem
is not the merit of any particular rule but the body of rules themselves:
bureaucracy requires uniformity while minorities' needs demand
flexibility. 130
The political weakness of stigmatized minorities exacerbates the costs
of bureaucratic uniformity. This weakness impedes minorities' ability to
obtain rules that reflect their needs. While the effectiveness of any rule-
based approach is limited by its neglect of individual variation, rules
systematically focused on counteracting stigma's educational consequences
could nonetheless lessen stigma's harmful effects. But the concomitants of
minorities' stigmatized status produce political weakness, which, in turn,
precludes minorities from obtaining bureaucratic rules broadly reflective of
their needs. Specifically, minorities are in the minority, relatively poor,
130. Cf. WILSON, supra note 5, at 339 ("A rule is a general statement prescribing how a class
of behaviors should be conducted. Using a general statement to produce an individualized result
is almost a contradiction in terms.").
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and subject to a stigma that impedes their ability to ally with otherwise
like-minded groups. The inter-relationship of public schools' disposition
toward rulemaking, and minorities' political weakness, embeds
ineffectiveness into the foundation of public schooling.
This Part will describe the rigid, rule-bound reality of public schools.
Next, it will demonstrate that bureaucratic uniformity is not accidental, but
is fundamental to public schools' institutional context. Finally, this Part
will show that stigmatized minorities are politically weak, and therefore
unable to extract educational policies from public schools systematically
responsive to their needs.
A. Public Schools Are Highly Bureaucratic-Particularly Those
Serving Stigmatized Minorities.
Public schools are heavily bureaucratic. They operate in a maze of
mandates that largely dictate their philosophic, curricular, and pedagogic
direction.131 These mandates derive principally from three sources: (1)
directives codified in federal, state, or local law, (2) collective-bargaining
rules, and (3) compliance-related obligations-principally documentary
and judicial mandates--derivative of the first two sources.
Federal regulation of public schools, for most of the past fifty years,
has been discrete in scope but robust in depth. Yet, in the past twenty
years, federal oversight has expanded into broad substantive matters.
Federal oversight traditionally concerned the equitable education of racial
minorities, women, children with disabilities, and the poor. The Supreme
Court's decisions in the Brown line of cases, along with civil-rights statutes
131. See PAUL S. GROGAN & TONY PROSCIO, COMEBACK CITIES: A BLUEPRINT FOR URBAN
NEIGHBORHOOD REVIVAL 176, 223-224 (Westview Press 2000); JEFFREY C. HENIG ET AL., THE
COLOR OF SCHOOL REFORM: RACE, POLITICS, AND THE CHALLENGE OF URBAN EDUCATION 29,
274 (third prtg. 2001); WILBUR RICH, BLACK MAYORS AND SCHOOL POLITICS: THE FAILURE OF
REFORM IN DETROIT, FARY, AND NEWARK 9, 13, 203-208 (1996); see also JOHN E. CHUBB &
TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, & AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 58 (1990) ("The public world of
educational practice is a world of rules imposed on the schools by local, state, and federal
authorities."); FREDERICK M. HESS, AM. ENTER. INST. & MARTIN R. WEST, BROOKINGS INST., A
BETTER BARGAIN: OVERHAULING TEACHER COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE 21 ST CENTURY 6
(2006), available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/pepg/PDF/Papers/BetterBargain.pdf
("[C]ollective bargaining agreements hamstring reform efforts in significant ways .... ");
Common Good, Law and Public Education: The Paralyzing Effects of Excessive Bureaucracy
http://cgood.org/schools-reading-cgpubs-factsheets-7.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2007) [herinafter
Common Good, Effects of Excessive Bureaucracy] ("The nearly endless bureaucratic rules in
America's schools prevent teachers and school administrators from effectively creating learning
environments.").
132. Corcoran & Goertz, supra note 15, at 35. Given the absence of direct regulatory
authority over local education, Congress has used its Spending Clause power to entice state
compliance with federal education priorities.
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enacted in the mid-1960s, spurred significant federal intervention into
school affairs on desegregation and gender-equity matters. 133 Similarly, the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975-subsequently re-
codified as the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA")-
allowed for federal micro-management of the process and substance of
special education. Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
of 1965 ("ESEA") also regulated, albeit in a less constraining way, the kind
of education available to the poor. 134 Collectively, federal intervention in
these areas is substantial, 35 as national directives override local discretion
on fundamental issues of student placement, tracking, discipline, and
finances. 1
36
Special-education regulation, in particular, is disproportionately
constraining. Over twenty percent of public-school funding, for example,
is devoted to special education, even though less than thirteen percent of
students are classified as having special needs. 137 This disparity in funding
derives in large part from compliance with federal mandates. 38 Not only
does federal law specify the goal of a "free appropriate public education"
for children with disabilities, but it also micro-manages means. 139  Each
school must develop a defined "Individualized Education Program" (IEP)
and comply with scores of procedural and substantive mandates.140 Among
133. Aaron Jay Saiger, The Last Wave: The Rise of the Contingent School District, 84 N.C. L.
REV. 857, 875-876 (2006).
134. Corcoran & Goertz, supra note 15, at 34-36.
135. Id.; Saiger, supra note 133, at 875-876 n.92.
136. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 131, at 10, 150; Corcoran & Goertz, supra note 15, at 34-35;
Saiger, supra note 133, at 875-876 n.92.
137. CATO HANDBOOK FOR CONGRESS: POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE 108TH
CONGRESS, 306-307 (Edward H. Crane & David Boaz eds., 2003) available at
http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hbi 08/hb 108-29.pdf [hereinafter CATO HANDBOOK]; Saiger,
supra note 133, at 869-870. Moreover, eighty-four percent of superintendents complain that
mandated special-education spending diverts disproportionate amounts of school spending away
from general-education budgets. Press Release, Pub. Agenda, Politics and Bureaucracy, Not
Lack of Funding, are Chief Irritants for Superintendents and Principals (Nov. 14, 2001), available
at http://www.publicagenda.org/press/press-releasedetail.cfm?list=38 [hereinafter Pub. Agenda,
Politics and Bureaucracy].
138. CATO HANDBOOK, supra note 137, at 307.
139. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1) (2006).
140. EDUC. LAW CTR., THE RIGHT TO SPECIAL EDUCATION IN NEW JERSEY: A GUIDE FOR
ADVOCATES 18-23 (2004), available at http://www.edlawcenter.org/ELCPublic/Publications/
PDF/RightsSpecialEducationGuide.pdf (noting, for example, mandates specifying the
individuals who must attend an IEP meeting; when and where the meeting can occur; the
language the meeting is to be conducted in; notice requirements; particular ways students are to
participate in IEP development; statement of how the student's progress toward annual goals will
be measured; and a statement of how the parent or guardian is to be informed of his or her child's
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other things, the IEP must be developed by a prescribed child study team
("CST") whose membership is determined by federal law;'41 the CST must
meet and evaluate children according to specified timeframes;142 and
schools must provide services in the "least restrictive environment" as
defined by federal law.' 43 Parents, moreover, must also be provided a due-
process hearing before an administrative-law judge if they disagree with
the IEP. 14 4  Compliance with special-education mandates is a principal
source of federal interference with school-level discretion. 145
In addition to these areas of traditional concern, the federal
government has expanded its regulatory purview over the last two decades.
Beginning in the 1980s-prompted largely by the publication of the
seminal A Nation at Risk report, which chronicled the decreasing
international competitiveness of American students-the federal
government began raising its qualitative expectations of student
performance. 146 The 1988 amendments to the ESEA required states to set
minimum performance standards for low-income students in schools
receiving ESEA funds. The Improving America's Schools Act of 1994,
and its successor, the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 ("NCLB"),
extended this approach to all schools and broadened the scope of regulated
subject matter. NCLB is the culmination of the past two decades of
increasing federal regulation of public schools. It requires states to meet
more rigorous academic standards, implement annual testing in specified
grades, ensure schools employ "highly qualified" teachers, and initiate
federally defined accountability regimes. 
147
progress towards annual goals). The notion of an Individualized Education Program, the terms of
which are micro-managed by federal law, is ironic to say the least.
141. 34 C.F.R. § 300.344 (2006).
142. 34 C.F.R. § 300.343 (2006).
143. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5) (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 300.130 (2006).
144. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 300.500-517 (2006).
145. CATO HANDBOOK, supra note 137, at 305
146. Corcoran & Goertz, supra note 15, at 35.
147. Id. at 35-36. NCLB's accountability mandates are especially micro-managing. The
statute requires that all students in specified grade levels meet specified performance standards,
20 U.S.C. § 6516(a)(4) (2006); that all students in disaggregated demographic groups also meet
these standards, id § 6311 (b)(3)(C)(xiii); that states label schools as failing when insufficient
numbers of students meet these benchmarks, id. § 6316(b)(1)(A) (2006); that local schools allow
students in failing schools to transfer to non-failing schools, id § 6316(b)(1)(E)(i); that schools
undergo federally prescribed "corrective action" when failing to meet specified benchmarks for
three years, id. § 6316(b)(7)(C)(iv); and that schools undergo wholesale "restructuring" which
may include reopening the school as a public charter school, id. § 6316(b)(7)(C)(iv)(VI);
replacing all or most of the school staff, id. § 6316(b)(7)(C)(iv)(l); or state takeover of the school
when failing to meet specified benchmarks for six years. id. § 6316(b)(8)(B)(i-v).
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As generally is the case with government regulation of public
schools,1 48 federal regulation disproportionately affects urban districts
serving stigmatized minorities. For example, special-education regulation
is particularly micro managing. As discussed above, the racially
stigmatized are uniquely vulnerable to special-education classification, as
stigma tracks the messages concerning student capacity implied by
classification. It is thus unsurprising that African-American students
constitute seventeen percent of the total student population, yet comprise
thirty-three percent of students diagnosed as mentally retarded. 49 In fact, a
Black student is nearly three times more likely to be labeled mentally
retarded than his White peer. 50 Because minority children are
disproportionately educated in urban districts, this translates into
disproportionate special-education obligations for urban schools.15'
Special-education obligations, as discussed, are merely one aspect of
the federal puzzle. Urban districts also face extraordinary regulatory
obligations under other federal mandates. Oversight under NCLB is
uniquely burdensome. Given NCLB's intensive mandates on improved
performance-not only for schools overall, but identified demographic
groups, including racial and ethnic minorities-urban schools face the full
brunt of NCLB's mandates. 5 2  In addition, because urban districts are
economically disadvantaged, they rely more than other districts on
148. Infra Part IV.C.
149. Daniel J. Losen & Gary Orfield, Introduction to RACIAL INEQUITY IN SPECIAL
EDUCATION, at xvi (Daniel J. Losen & Gary Orfield eds., 2002).
150. Id. at xix; see also id. at xx ("Black students are 2.88 times more likely than Whites to
be labeled mentally retarded and 1.92 times more likely to be labeled emotionally disturbed.").
151. JAY G. CHAMBERS ET AL., SPECIAL EDUC. EXPENDITURE PROJECT, How DOES
SPENDING ON SPECIAL EDUCATION STUDENTS VARY ACROSS DISTRICTS? 1 (2002), available at
http://www.csef-air.org/publications/seep/national/AdvRpt2.pdf (providing that local education
agencies spend approximately ninety percent more to educate special education students than for
students without any special needs); see, e.g., Frederick M. Hess, Courting Backlash: The Risks
of Emphasizing Input Over School Performance, 6 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 11, 39 (1998)
(explaining that, in 1999, school officials in Washington, D.C. devoted twenty-five percent of the
district's budget to special education, even though only ten percent of its students received special
education services); Priscilla Pardini, Special Education: Promises and Problems, RETHINKING
SCHOOLS, Spring 2002, http://www.rethinkingschools.org/archive/16_03/Proml63.shtml (noting
Milwaukee Public Schools spent fourteen percent of its budget on special education).
152. For example, urban districts comprise twenty-seven percent of Title I schools, but
represent forty-two percent of the schools identified for improvement under NCLB. CTR. ON
EDUC. POLICY, NCLB: URBAN SCHOOL DISTRICTS ARE TAGGED FOR IMPROVEMENT AT HIGHER
RATES THAN SUBURBAN OR RURAL SCHOOLS 1 (June 2005), available at
http://www.cep-dc.org/nclb/NCLBpolicyBriefs2005/CEPPBlweb.pdf. Title I schools are those
that receive federal funds under Title I of NCLB's predecessor, the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act. Id.
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federally subsidized grants to support education services. 53 These federal
grants invariably include a body of regulations that inhibit local discretion
in pursuit of federal goals. 154 In all of these ways, the discretion-removing
tendencies of federal regulation are exacerbated in urban districts.
Although federal oversight is substantial, state and local laws produce
most bureaucratic constraints on public schools. 155 These mandates span
the range of a district's educational responsibilities: graduation
requirements;156 curricular offerings and pedagogical methodologies;
157
which textbooks may be used; 58 how student achievement is assessed;
159
length of the school day and school year; 60 terms of teacher and
administrator certification;' 61 terms of tenure protection; 162 and class size
153. See, e.g., HENIG ET AL., supra note 131, at 252; RICH, supra note 131, at 13.
154. RICH, supra note 131, at 13 (providing that "control is increasingly abdicated to the state
bureaucracy and a variety of grant driven programs of the federal government.").
155. Corcoran & Goertz, supra note 15, at 33-43; see also HENIG ET AL., supra note 131, at
252 ("States in particular impose a detailed regulatory network on local districts.").
156. See, e.g., Corcoran & Goertz, supra note 15, at 37; HENIG ET AL., supra note 131, at
253; Herbert J. Walberg, Real Accountability, in OUR SCHOOLS & OUR FUTURE: ARE WE STILL
AT RISK? 305, 306-17 (Paul E. Peterson ed., 2003)
157. DAVID T. CONLEY, WHO GOVERNS OUR SCHOOLS: CHANGING ROLES AND
RESPONSIBILITIES 1 (2003); Corcoran & Goertz, supra note 15, at 37-38; Walberg, supra note
156, at 309 (discussing state regulation of public-school curriculum); ELANE WALKER,
EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY AND THE COURTS: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 131, 155-56 (2005).
158. See Matthew Bender & Co., Statutes Regulating School Curriculum on the Selection of
Textbooks, Instructional, Library, or Resource Materials, 7R1 Education Law § 10, tbl. 10
(2006).
159. Walberg, supra note 156, at 309 (discussing standardized-test requirements throughout
the country and alignment of state-mandated curriculum requirements with tests).
160. Corcoran & Goertz, supra note 15, at 37.
161. Chaim Karczag, Undermining Teacher Quality: The Perverse Consequences of
Certification, in EDUCATIONAL FREEDOM IN URBAN AMERICA: BROWN V. BOARD AFTER HALF
A CENTURY 109, 110-13 (David Salisbury & Casey Lartigue, Jr. eds., 2004). State laws,
moreover, dictate the substantive content of certification, requiring candidates to attend pre-
approved post-baccalaureate programs, and take pre-determined courses. Id. Certification,
however, is weakly linked to student achievement. See, e.g., GREENE, supra note 66, at 61-70
(2005); Karczag, supra, at 119 ("[T]here is little evidence linking teacher certification to student
achievement."). Even worse, growing evidence suggests certification lowers teacher quality by
deterring talented candidates. See Howard Fuller & George A. Mitchell, A Culture of Complaint,
EDUC. NEXT, Summer 2006, at 18, 21 ("Inflexible staffing rules... undermine the ability of
urban schools to hire and keep the best possible teachers." (internal quotations omitted)); Richard
Riley, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Educ., New Challenges, A New Resolve: Moving Education into the
21st Century (Feb. 16, 1999), available at http://www.ed.gov/Speeches/02-1999/990216.html
("Too many potential teachers are turned away because of the cumbersome process that requires
them to jump through hoops and lots of them."). But see Mary Diez, In Defense of Regulation, in
CHOICE AND COMPETITION IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 43-45 (Paul E. Peterson ed., 2005) (noting
that teacher certification "has served its basic purpose" in ensuring teacher competency and that a
well-designed program could improve teacher quality).
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and student-teacher ratios, among others. 63 While states vary on the
density of regulation, bureaucratic micro-management is an irreducible
feature of contemporary public schooling.' 64
In addition, as is the case concerning federal regulation, state
oversight is particularly high-handed in urban districts.' 65 States uniquely
impose on urban districts especially constraining mandates on curriculum
and pedagogy. Among these are requirements that urban districts use
consultant-driven programs that dictate on a class-by-class and sometimes
minute-by-minute basis precisely what and how teachers instruct their
students. 166  States also impose on urban districts singular limitations on
finances and operations, substantially limiting the discretion of urban
162. HENIG ET AL., supra note 131, at 252-53; HESS & WEST, supra note 131, at 27; see also
Frederick M. Hess and Martin R. West, Strike Phobia: School Boards Need to Drive a Harder
Bargain, EDUC. NEXT, Summer 2006, at 41 [hereinafter Hess & West, Strike Phobia] (reporting
that all but five states have laws granting teachers tenure after three or fewer years on the job).
Moreover, almost eighty percent of superintendents and roughly seventy percent of principals
report that they need more authority to remove ineffective teachers. Pub. Agenda, Politics and
Bureaucracy, supra note 137.
163. Class Size Matters, State and Local Efforts Across the Nation to Reduce Class Size,
http://www.classsizematters.org/Stateandlocalefforts.html (last visited Mar. 5, 2007); Education
Week, Class Size, http://www.edweek.org/rc/issues/class-size/?levelld=1000 (last visited Mar. 5,
2007); see, e.g., GREENE, supra note 66, at 50-51 (discussing attempts in Florida and New York
to reduce class sizes statewide).
164. See, e.g., WALKER, supra note 157, at 156 ("State departments of education have
traditionally relied upon the use of regulations to bring about conformity to state education
policies and to influence practice in the field.").
165. GROGAN & PROSCIO, supra note 131, at 176 (discussing "immovable, unresponsive, and
draconian mandates" applicable to urban public schools); HENIG, supra note 131, at 257-66
(discussing incessant, externally driven state reform efforts in urban districts); RICH, supra note
13 1, at 13 (providing, concerning urban schools, that "administrative sovereignty is lost ... to the
state bureaucracy and a variety of grant-driven programs of the federal government"); WALKER,
supra note 157, at 131, 155 (high-needs districts more likely to be subject to regulation);
Haberman, supra note 123 (discussing "endless stream of regulations and funding mechanisms"
applicable to urban districts).
166. WILLIAM G. OUCHI, MAKING SCHOOLS WORK: A REVOLUTIONARY PLAN TO GET
YOUR CHILDREN THE EDUCATION THEY NEED 76-78 (2003) (describing the lock-step approach
of Open Court, a reading program adopted by the states of California & Texas, as well as
numerous districts and schools around the country); Success for All Foundation, FAQ's,
http://www.successforall.net/middle/sfa.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2007) (explaining how the
Success for All program is currently used in more than 1,300 schools in over 500 school
districts); Success for All Foundation, Middle School, http://www.successforall.net/middle/
sfa.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2007) (describing how the Success for All program provides teachers
with detailed lesson plans, all necessary student materials, assessment tools, instructional
strategies, and student and teacher goals); see also Abbott v. Burke, 153 N.J. 480, 604-05 (1998)
("heartedly" endorsing New Jersey's adoption of the Success for All program for urban districts).
But c.f Haberman, supra note 123 (noting urban-district vulnerability to consultant-driven
programs).
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administrators to allocate resources to uses locally preferred. 167 Even more,
states target urban districts for wholesale takeover of particular
administrative functions and, in some cases, the entirety of district
operations. 168  School takeover is the logical extension of the growing
micro-management of urban schools.
Moreover, although their discretion is circumscribed by federal and
state mandates, urban-district central offices represent another source of
bureaucracy. Given the size of urban districts, central offices prescribe
numerous rules that further remove discretion from school-level officials.
These rules largely implement federal and state mandates, but they also
codify district-wide administrative policies. 169 The diversity and density of
state and local mandates impose a virtual "straitjacket" on urban-district
officials.170 According to a former New York City schools Chancellor:
If I want to get things done, like instituting a longer school day, I
have to go get the Governor's signature, the mayor's signature,
the commissioner [of education's] signature, the board of regent's
signature .... Do you understand how much of my life I could
spend here just getting those stars in alignment?'
71
State and local oversight simply deprive school-based officials in urban
districts of meaningful discretion.
167. OUCHI, supra note 166, at 90-92 (explaining tendency of state politicians to dictate
budgetary obligations at the school level, removing the power to make such decisions from local
school administrators); LYDIA SEGAL, BATTLING CORRUPTION IN AMERICA'S PUBLIC SCHOOLS
89-93 (2004) (demonstrating that in most large school districts, budget decisions are largely
dictated by government mandates).
168. Corcoran & Goertz, supra note 15, at 48 (describing trend in local school governance,
especially in the urban context, to centralize school operations); OUCHI, supra note 166, at 57
(describing trend in many schools to remove the power from principals to make even basic
staffing decisions); see, e.g., Abbott, 153 N.J. at 498-501 (describing ways in which
commissioner of New Jersey's Department of Education may dictate, inter alia, a school's
curriculum, staff assignment, and expenditures).
169. See, e.g., SEGAL, supra note 167, at 89-93 (discussing district rules on budgeting and
finances).
170. Matthew Miller, a journalist who followed the travails of the Los Angeles district's
superintendent for several months used this precise term. Matthew Miller, The Super, WASH.
MONTHLY, June 2001, available at http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2001/
01 06.miller.html ("A big-city superintendent ... operates in a straitjacket .... ); see also HENIG
ET AL., supra note 131, at 28 ("Local school districts are not autonomous and independent. They
function within a broader federal system in which most formal power ultimately rests with the
states."); RICH, supra note 13 1, at 214 (providing, concerning urban districts serving stigmatized
minorities, that "[tihe governing school boards are not free to introduce new curriculum or to
change personnel policies" given state-law micro-management); Pub. Agenda, Politics and
Bureaucracy, supra note 137 ("[Superintendents and principals] are convinced that strong
leadership can transform schools.., but politics and bureaucracy just eat away at them.").
171. Rebecca Winters, Is Superintendent... A Job for a Super Hero, TIME, Feb. 7, 2000,
available at http://jcgi.pathfinder.comltime/magazine/article/0,9171,996011 -2,00.html.
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Furthermore, while federal, state, and local mandates preempt
meaningful school-level discretion to tailor substantive educational services
to student needs, collective-bargaining rules achieve the same result
concerning operations. Collective-bargaining agreements, often in
excruciating detail, specify the terms and conditions of employment for
principals and teachers and thus greatly restrict the capacity of local
administrators to manage schools effectively. Among other things,
collective-bargaining agreements: (1) define tenure protections, specifying
detailed procedural and regulatory rules governing principal and teacher
accountability; 172 (2) impose lockstep compensation requirements, forcing
principals and teachers to be paid exclusively on the basis of specified
credentials and years of experience; (3) mandate rigid job-assignment and
transfer rules, precluding administrators from allocating staff to their best
use; (4) and prescribe mechanical limitations on teacher evaluation,
preventing principals from flexibly shaping assessment criteria to serve
student needs. 1
73
As with statutory and administrative mandates, collective-bargaining
directives are particularly rigid in urban districts, containing stultifying
procedures and lockstep rules on seemingly every aspect of school
governance. Many urban-district union contracts span hundreds of pages
and are supplemented by thousands of additional pages in appendices and
addenda. 174 These mandates constrain school officials on bread-and-butter
172. For example, it took one California school district thirteen years and $312,000 to fire
one teacher for incompetence. James Payne, The Agony of Public Education, 5 INDEP. REv. 265,
272. Additionally, only twenty-four percent of superintendents and thirty-two percent of
principals report that they have enough autonomy to reward outstanding teachers and staff; only
twenty-eight percent of superintendents and thirty-two percent of principals report that they have
sufficient authority to remove ineffective teachers; and fifty-six percent of teachers believe that
the tenure system should be changed to facilitate the removal of bad teachers. Common Good,
Effects of Excessive Bureaucracy, supra note 13 1.
173. HESS & WEST, supra note 131, at 30-32 (discussing agreements prohibiting principals
from considering student performance on standardized tests in evaluating teachers); Hess & West,
Strike Phobia, supra note 162, at 43 (discussing lock-step teacher salaries based on length of
service, not quality of performance); OUCHI, supra note 166, at 57-58 (explaining inflexible top-
down staffing rules that impede a principal's ability to effectively manage his or her school).
174. Frederick M. Hess and Andrew P. Kelly, Scapegoat, Albatross, or What? The Status
Quo in Teacher Collective Bargaining, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN EDUCATION:
NEGOTIATING CHANGE IN TODAY'S SCHOOLS (Jane Hannaway & Andrew J. Rotherham eds.,
2006); see, e.g., Fuller & Mitchell, supra note 161, at 19-20 (describing a recent collective-
bargaining agreement in Milwaukee as spanning over 200 pages and containing over 2,000
addenda); Eva Moskowitz, Breakdown: The Ten-Foot Rule and Other Fine Points of Collective
Bargaining in New York City, EDUC. NEXT, Summer 2006 (describing New York City collective-
bargaining agreement of over 600 pages, including addenda).
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issues of compensation and evaluation,1 75 assignment rights,176  and
tenure.177 In addition, urban districts confront a menu of stifling work rules
on matters spanning the scope of school operations. These rules, for
example, limit the number of successive and total hours a teacher can
teach;178 constrain the number of students a teacher instructs; 179 prohibit
principals from asking teachers to supervise study halls or participate in
after-school programs;18 restrict the number of lesson plans a teacher can
175. HESS & WEST, supra note 131, at 30-32 (discussing agreements prohibiting the
consideration of student performance on standardized tests in evaluating teacher performance and
agreements delineating detailed procedural, record-keeping, and documentary requirements
concerning evaluation); Hess & West, Strike Phobia, supra note 162, at 41, 43 (providing sample
of contract provisions regulating teacher evaluation and the lock-step nature of teacher
compensation).
176. Urban districts tend to be characterized by unyielding "voluntary transfer" edicts,
empowering senior teachers unilaterally to transfer to another school, even if the receiving school
is disinclined to hire the teacher. JESSICA LEVIN ET AL., THE NEW TEACHER PROJECT,
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: THE CASE FOR REFORMING THE STAFFING RULES IN URBAN
TEACHERS UNION CONTRACTS 8-9 (2005), available at http://www.tntp.org/files/
UnintentdedConsequences.pdf. A recent empirical analysis found that these rules cause urban
schools to employ teachers whose qualifications do not comport with the schools' particular
needs. Id. at 5, 9.
177. Concerning tenure, urban-district tenure rules are so impenetrable that administrators
have an exceedingly difficult time terminating even the most incompetent teachers. See, e.g.,
FREDERICK HESS, REVOLUTION AT THE MARGINS: THE IMPACT OF COMPETITION ON URBAN
SCHOOL SYSTEMS 58, 93-94 (2002) (discussing unsuccessful attempts of an urban superintendent
to dismiss incompetent teachers, including one who was videotaped reading a newspaper while
students were shooting craps in the classroom); THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM, supra note 56, at
260 (noting that tenured teachers are protected from removal by union contracts, and state laws
and regulations). Indeed, a recent analysis of five representative urban districts revealed that only
one of every 18,650 tenured teachers was fired for poor performance. LEVIN ET AL., supra note
176, at 18. Tenure rules induce districts to forego disciplinary action, leaving in place ineffective
teachers. Id. at 17 (explaining that many principals place poorly performing teachers on excess
lists, thereby shuffling the teacher from one school to another instead of following through with
disciplinary or removal proceedings).
A recent study showed that only .05% of public school teachers were involuntarily removed
from their positions in 1997. Mike Antonucci, Teacher Tenure Reform: Mandate or Mirage, in A
CONSUMER'S GUIDE TO TEACHER QUALITY: OPPORTUNITY AND CHALLENGE IN THE NO CHILD
LEFT BEHIND ACT OF 2001, at 1, 1 (2002). Moreover, in a two-year period, the New York City
school board, an employer of 72,000 teachers, only sought to terminate three teachers for
incompetence. Id. Firing three out of 72,000 teachers over a two-year period works out to
terminating .0021% of teachers per year. Furthermore, the Los Angeles Unified School District,
the second largest in the country, brought only one teacher termination to the final phase of the
dismissal process between 1990-1999. Id.
178. See, e.g., Moskowitz, supra note 174 (discussing a New York City agreement limiting
teachers to no more than 2.25 successive hours of teaching and no more than 3.75 hours of total
teaching per day).
179. Fuller & Mitchell, supra note 161, at 18-19; HESS & WEST, supra note 131, at 29-30.
180. HESS & WEST, supra note 13 1, at 29-30; Moskowitz, supra note 174.
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prepare;1 81 limit principal review of lesson plans; 182 limit faculty meetings
and training to predetermined hours;' 83 cap the number of parent
conferences a teacher must hold; 184 and restrict how and how often teachers
evaluate student work. 85 These rules paralyze the operational capacity of
urban schools to adapt services to the unique challenges their students
present. 86 The recent statement of an urban superintendent on union rules
is illustrative: "You have Gulliver and the Lilliputians. You've got a
thousand of these little ropes. None of them in and of [themselves] can
hold the system down, but you get enough of them in place... and the
giant is immobilized."'
' 87
Finally, correlative to bureaucracy is compliance. To ensure
compliance government directs public schools to submit documentation.
And, given the extensive scope of governing regulations, this paperwork
responsibility is onerous. 88  Similarly, individuals harmed by rule
violations often possess legal recourse. Given the proliferation of rules,
schools are routinely subject to enforcement actions and derivative court
mandates. According to a nationwide survey, half of public school
superintendents protest they devote too much time to litigation-related
matters. 89 These obligations constitute a bureaucracy of their own, further
encumbering school-based discretion. Moreover, because urban schools
181. HESS & WEST, supra note 131, at 29-30.
182. Fuller & Mitchell, supra note 161, at 20; HESS & WEST, supra note 131, at 29-30.
183. Fuller & Mitchell, supra note 161, at 20.
184. HESS & WEST, supra note 131, at 30.
185. Id.
186. The New Teacher Project's report on the teacher-staffing provisions of urban-district
collective-bargaining agreements found that union rules precluded urban schools from hiring and
retaining those teachers most capable of meeting the needs of a particular school's student
population. LEVIN ET AL., supra note 176, at 8-9, 12-15. Similarly, a recent study of urban
school superintendents found that over two-thirds of them cited collective-bargaining rules as a
major impediment to school reform. Fuller & Mitchell, supra note 161, at 20-21. Moreover,
more than half of principals believe that they "are so overwhelmed by day-to-day management,
that their ability to provide vision and leadership is stymied." Pub. Agenda, Politics and
Bureaucracy, supra note 137. Superintendents also reported that these rules inhibit their
effectiveness in meeting student needs. Common Good, Law and Public Education, supra note
131.
187. Fuller & Mitchell, supra note 161, at 21 (ellipsis in original).
188. Haberman, supra note 123; see, e.g., WALKER, supra note 157, at 157 ("[R]egulatory
unreasonableness [as] a situation in which the means for determining whether a regulatory goal
has been attained assumes greater saliency than the goal itself... [and] is exemplified by a
focus ... on formalistic, legalistic, standardized inspection processes.").
189. Public Agenda, Politics and Bureaucracy, supra note 131.
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face enhanced bureaucracy, they generally confront more inhibiting
paperwork responsibilities and judicial dictates. 190
Individually, these layers of mandates-arising from statutory and
regulatory mandates, collective bargaining, and compliance obligations-
hamstring school-based discretion to adapt services to student needs.
Collectively, at least for urban districts serving stigmatized minorities, they
functionally eliminate that discretion. Ninety percent of public school
superintendents and principals report that bureaucracy deprives them of
needed autonomy. 191 And almost seventy percent report these mandates
inhibit effective education. 192 The challenge here is not the propriety of
any particular rule, but the cumulative constraint produced by the body of
rules. 193 From the setting of educational philosophy to the development
and implementation of curriculum and pedagogy, bureaucratic rules
prescribe the means and ends of public education, sometimes specifying the
content and methodology of education practice on a class-by-class basis.
Moreover, these rules micro-manage daily operations by dictating uniform
standards on compensation, staff evaluation, student assessment, employee
tenure, and the quantity of student instruction. Correlative compliance
obligations pile on and effectively straitjacket local officials, particularly
in urban districts. This body of rules removes flexibility from school-based
officials, and produces a one-size-fits-all orientation.
B. Bureaucracy Is Fundamental to Public Schools-Particularly
Those Serving Stigmatized Minorities.
The bureaucratic disposition of public schools is not accidental, but is
central to political accountability. 194  Political accountability is
characterized by two fundamental elements: democratic hierarchy and
political uncertainty. As explained below, these factors pull government
toward rulemaking, as the removal of local discretion is vital both to the
190. Haberman, supra note 123.
191. STEVE FARKAS ET AL., PUB. AGENDA, TRYING TO STAY AHEAD OF THE GAME:
SUPERINTENDENTS AND PRINCIPALS TALK ABOUT SCHOOL LEADERSHIP (2001), available at
http://www.publicagenda.com/specials/leadership/leadership 1 .htm.
192. Id. (showing that sixty-four percent of superintendents and sixty-seven percent of
principals claim either that bureaucracy ties their hands entirely or they have to "work around"
the system to get things done).
193. Some amount of bureaucracy, of course, is essential to protecting public values and,
correspondingly, some rules are more sensible than others. But, as discussed in Part IV.B.,
political accountability in the schools context is structurally disposed toward the kind of
excessive rulemaking described above.
194. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 131, at 46-47 (describing deliberate implementation of
bureaucracy in part to ensure accountability); WILSON, supra note 5, at 344 (providing that the
American political system is "biased" toward rulemaking).
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imposition of hierarchical democratic values and to insulating current
priorities from interference by other government actors. These
bureaucratic tendencies are exacerbated in public schools principally due to
three additional features of school politics: (1) the monopolistic nature of
public schooling, (2) the extent to which the federal and state governments
subsidize public schools, and (3) increased public attention over the past
twenty-five years on school effectiveness. Finally, stigma exacerbates the
bureaucratic pull of these factors, yielding greater degrees of bureaucracy
in urban districts disproportionately serving stigmatized minorities. In
these ways, the institutional incentives governing public schools induce
uniformity.
1. Political Accountability Generally Leads to Bureaucracy.
Public schools are government agencies, created by political
authorities to implement public objectives. In fact, their very existence is
instrumental: public schools are means of achieving priorities determined
politically at a higher level of government. 195  Politics, therefore,
"dominates the life of a government organization. Politics determines to
what extent the agency is funded; what its purposes are; how many
personnel it has; whether it exists at all." 196 A necessary corollary is the
removal of discretion. Government creates agencies to vindicate political
objectives, and agencies therefore must be constrained to ensure they serve
those objectives. 197  Constraint, therefore, is an essential ingredient of
public schooling.
198
This disposition toward constraint leads to dense bureaucracy for
several reasons. First, political authorities represent a wide range of
interests, and political authorities are predisposed to promulgate rules in
order to pacify those interests. 199  Public policy is not determined
academically in a vacuum, but is the by-product of a messy struggle among
diverse constituencies at multiple levels of government seeking to steer
195. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 131, at 45-47; Jonathan Zasloff, Children, Families, and
Bureaucrats: A Prehistory of Welfare Reform, 14 J.L. & POL. 225, 251-52, 259 (1998).
196. Zasloff, supra note 195, at 251.
197. CHUBB& MOE, supra note 131, at 46-47; WILSON, supra note 5, at 344.
198. HENIG, supra note 131, at 252 ("[T]he politics of education comes with strings
attached."); WILSON, supra note 5, at 317 (providing that bureaucratic constraints facilitate
political objectives).
199. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 131, at 46-47; WILSON, supra note 5, at 317 ("The political
process can more easily enforce compliance with constraints than the attainment of goals."); id. at
366-67; Zasloff, supra note 195, at 254.
Fall 2006] THE STRUCTURAL INADEQUACY OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS
public priorities in self-serving directions.200 Education policy, therefore, is
structurally inefficient-at least to the extent efficiency is defined in terms
of student learning.20 1 Education policy does not reflect neutral decision-
making about students' educational needs, but embodies a hodgepodge of
priorities advanced by those groups best able to attain and wield political
authority. Political authorities are disposed to issue rules to satisfy these
interests, both because rules provide readily available means of achieving
discrete political objectives and because the concreteness of rules permit
ready enforcement.
20 2
Second, democratic hierarchy leads to rulemaking because
government authority is highly fragmented, particularly on education
matters. Politicians seeking to affect education policy confront a web of
government actors. They face the vertical, federalism challenge of
harnessing political authority across federal, state, and local government.
At each of these levels, competing political authorities possess the ability to
interfere with preferred policies. Politicians also face the horizontal,
separation-of-powers challenge of harnessing political authority within any
given level of government. For example, the President must confront
Congress; the governor must do battle with state legislative leaders; the
commissioner of education must wrestle with the state board and the
governor; the superintendent must accommodate the school board and
perhaps municipal government. Political authorities seeking to affect
200. See Linda Babcock & George Lowenstein, Explaining Bargaining Impasse: The Role of
Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 109, 109-10, 116-17 (1997) (analyzing how notions of
fairness and public policy are shaped by the goals that competing interests groups seek to
achieve); Christo Lassiter, The New Race Cases and the Politics of Public Policy, J.L. & POL.
411, 435-36 (1996) (describing public policy as benefit-conferring process that rewards one group
over another).
201. See Corcoran & Goertz, supra note 15, at 42-43 ("Expansion of the state role in public
education has been accompanied by an expansion of the number and types of citizens and
organizations seeking to shape education policy decisions, transforming the political structure
from a statewide monolith to a fragmented system of education politics."); James Q. Wilson, Can
the Bureaucracy be Deregulated? Lessons from Government Agencies, in DEREGULATING THE
PUBLIC SERVICE: CAN GOVERNMENT BE IMPROVED? 37, 40 (John J. Dilulio, Jr. ed., 1994)
[hereinafter Wilson, Deregulated] ("Outside forces--elected officials, interest groups, employee
organizations, professional associations, the courts, and the media--demand a voice in running
the agencies and make that demand effective by imposing rules on them and insisting and
insisting that all the rules be enforced all the time."). Public schools, therefore, are not
fundamentally designed to vindicate students' educational needs; schools are agents of society.
See CHUBB & MOE, supra note 131, at 32 ("[Plublic schools ... are literally not supposed to
provide [students] with the kind of education they might want. The schools are agencies of
society as a whole, and everyone has a right to participate in their governance." (emphasis
removed)).
202. WILSON, supra note 5, at 317, 331-32, 363-64.
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school policy face a diffuse regulatory environment in which actors at
multiple levels possess the capacity to derail priorities.2 °3
Third, beyond the extent to which political authorities possess the
capacity to frustrate efforts to impose higher-order values, the same
dynamic threatens implementation at the school level. Federal and state
politicians, in particular, are far removed from the schoolhouse. Even
assuming political authorities across multiple levels of government support
particular policies, dissenting school-based staff may obstruct
implementation. School-based staff, moreover, may not have the capacity
or competency to implement a policy consistent with governing purposes.
The ability of local officials to impede implementation of higher-order
priorities encourages public authorities to prescribe in specific detail both
the substance of these values, and the processes by which they are
pursued.20 4
The concern that other government actors may obstruct higher-order
values leads to another cause of public school bureaucracy: political
insecurity. The struggle for political authority is permanent.20 5  In the
context of education politics, this struggle is compounded by the place of
the school board within the range of federal, state, county, and municipal
offices implicated by education policy. The perpetually impending
character of the next pertinent election means that authorities face a
political environment fraught with instability. Policies for which a political
consensus has been obtained as a matter of horizontal or vertical
policymaking may be weakened depending on the results of the next
election. 20 6 This facilitates bureaucracy because rulemaking reduces the
ability of successive regimes to dismantle pre-existing policies.0 7
At the same time, the desire to preemptively promulgate rules further
fuels bureaucracy. Subsequent regimes, seeking to pursue their own
policies and having to confront preexisting rules, have incentives to impose
their own rules in order to vindicate their new priorities. These new rules,
given the new motivations that produced them, often conflict with prior
203. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 131, at 39; WILSON, supra note 5, at 376-77.
204. WILSON, supra note 5, at 376-77.
205. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 131, at 29 ("The result [of democratic politics] is a perpetual
struggle for the control of public authority. During elections, the various interests struggle to
place their partisans in public offices. Between elections, they struggle to influence how officials
actually exercise their authority.").
206. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 131, at 42-43.
207. Id.; see also WILSON, supra note 5, at 241-42 (providing that congressional
policymaking "increasingly takes the form of devising elaborate, detailed rules" thereby ensuring
continuity of a specific policy agenda).
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208regulations. For public schools, the intersection of political insecurity
and bureaucracy contributes to a "policy chum" in which political
authorities mandate a continuously changing, and often conflicting, set of
policies and accompanying rules.2 °9
The bureaucratic pull of democratic hierarchy and political insecurity
apply broadly, albeit to varying degrees, to varied kinds of government
agencies. 2 10 These criteria are supplemented, in the education context, by
principally three additional bureaucracy-producing factors: (1) the
monopolistic nature of public education, (2) the increasing funding of local
school districts by federal and state government, and (3) elevated political
attention to public-school effectiveness. Public schools in virtually every
school district in the country enjoy a monopoly on the public subsidy of
education services-public education subsidies flow overwhelmingly to
schools governed, managed, and operated by political authorities. This
leaves politicians without structural reasons to grant individual schools
discretion to deviate from prevailing norms.2 1 In a government monopoly,
political authorities are effectively the sole check on rulemaking. But, as
discussed above, the political nature of public authority itself contributes to
even larger bureaucracy. Public monopolies, therefore, provide no
meaningful restraint on bureaucracy. One analyst of school management
said it quite simply: "Bureaucracy flourishes wherever customers have no
choice."
,2 12
In addition, regulation is an essential characteristic of government
subsidy. The proportion of federal and state subsidies to local districts has
grown significantly in the last thirty years.21 3 Federal and state funding
208. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 131, at 42-43; WILSON, supra note 5, at 363-64 (providing,
given failure of rule-imposing bodies to regularly monitor outputs, that new rules are rarely
reconciled with prior rules).
209. HENIG, supra note 131, at 280 (using "reform de jour" to describe political process that
inundates schools with reform initiatives); FREDERICK M. HESS, SPINNING WHEELS: THE
POLITICS OF URBAN SCHOOL REFORM 52 (1999) (describing "policy chum"); CHRIS WHrIrLE,
CRASH COURSE: IMAGINING A BETTER FUTURE FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION (2005) (describing
perpetually shifting school reforms); Haberman, supra note 123 (describing the pressure on urban
school administrators to try out new curricular programs, many of which are not systematically or
carefully evaluated in advance).
210. WILSON, supra note 5, at 120-22, 188 (providing that it is the nature of democratic
institutions to implement bureaucratic controls).
211. Wilson, supra note 201, at 51.
212. OUCHI, supra note 166, at 14; see also Wilson, supra note 201, at 52 ("As long as a
school system has monopoly control over public education funds, it will have no incentive to
grant autonomy to any of its parts and every incentive to keep them on a short bureaucratic
leash.").
213. Corcoran & Goertz, supra note 15, at 34-35; Saiger, supra note 133, at 868.
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comprises almost sixty percent of school-district funding.214 As local
districts have increasingly relied upon external government subsidy, they
have likewise subjected themselves to external regulation. Regulatory
strings invariably accompany government money, and the strings reflect
215the subsidizing agent's priorities.
Finally, public concern for school effectiveness has increased
significantly in the last several decades. The enhanced focus induces
political authorities to respond in the best way they know how: regulation.
As discussed above, in the aftermath of Brown and the civil-rights
movement, the federal government assumed a more robust role on
education policy. At the same time, state governments' focus on education
increased both with the growing federal role, and as advocates sought state
remedies to supplement the traditionally discrete focus of federal
intervention.2 16 The publication of A Nation at Risk, coming at a time of
increasing government focus on educational efficacy, spurred government
efforts to raise curricular rigor and to increase accountability for
outcomes. 217  States throughout the country responded with burgeoning
bodies of rules, seeking to address the intensified focus on educational
effectiveness.218
Additionally, today's enhanced public focus on education derives
from the contemporary importance of education to social mobility.2t 9
Education in the information age is simply indispensable to economic and
social viability-and the public knows it. Consequently, the public places
extraordinary pressure on government to provide high-quality educational
services. 220 Because today's international economy is premised largely on
human capital, intense public focus on education is a fundamental aspect of
214. Corcoran & Goertz, supra note 15, at 41.
215. HENIG, supra note 131, at 252 (discussing insuperable connection between government
subsidy and government regulation).
216. Corcoran & Goertz, supra note 15, at 42-43.
217. CHUBB & MOE, supra note 131, at 9-10; Corcoran & Goertz, supra note 15, at 36-38;
WALKER, supra note 157, at 16-18.
218. Corcoran & Goertz, supra note 15, at 36-37.
219. See, e.g., RICHARD ROTHSTEIN & TAMARA WILDER, THE MANY DIMENSIONS OF
RACIAL INEQUALITY 112 (2005), available at http://devweb.tc.columbia.edu/manager/
symposium/files/83_rothstein.pdf, THERNSTROM & THERNSTROM, supra note 56, at 73-76.
220. For example, politicians today regularly tie their political fortunes to education reform.
See, e.g., George W. Bush, Foreword to No Child Left Behind, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
reports/no-child-left-behind.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2007); Brookings Institution, Bloomberg's
Education Reforms in New York City: An Assessment, http://www.brookings.edu/gs/brown/
events/20050601.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2007) (noting that Mayor Michael Bloomberg
requested and received control over New York City's public schools and his assertion that he
would be answerable for the ultimate success or failure to improve the City's schools).
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modem politics. 221  This intensified focus yields bureaucracy because
rulemaking is the primary means by which government authorities
effectuate political priorities.222
2. Districts Disproportionately Serving Stigmatized Minorities-
Particularly Those Governed by Stigmatized Minorities-Are
Uniquely Subject to Bureaucracy.
While the above-discussed factors instill bureaucracy into the very
structure of contemporary public schooling, they apply with even greater
force to urban districts serving minorities. As discussed, stigma, in both its
cognitive and conscious dimensions, affects institutional responses to the
stigmatized, causing institutions to engage the stigmatized in ways
reflective of diminished notions of their capacity. This suggests education
policymakers are likely to impose special rules on the stigmatized deriving
from that status.223
In addition, the hierarchical concern about the inclination or capacity
of subordinate actors to competently implement favored policies applies
particularly to urban districts. The general concern that local officials may
frustrate the vindication of higher-order priorities is surely aggravated
when local officials are subject to a stigma that challenges their existential
capacity. To that extent, public authorities, particularly at the federal and
state levels, are likely to be especially skeptical about the capacity of
districts administered by minorities to execute favored policies. 4  This
increases the general concern with lower-level interference with higher-
order policies, and thus uniquely encourages regulation.
Concerning the education-specific precipitants of bureaucracy,
stigmatized minorities have fewer viable alternatives to local public
schools, and therefore are more vulnerable to the bureaucratic pull of
public-school monopolies. White families disproportionately have the
resources to opt out of the local public school system either by sending
their children to private school or by moving to another district.
221. See id.
222. See supra, Part V.A.
223. See supra notes 121-125.
224. HENIG, supra note 131, at 267-71 (discussing extent to which state regulation invokes
perception that Blacks cannot run school districts); RICH, supra note 131, at 214 ("Blacks have
achieved political control but not the cultural authority to make fundamental changes in
educational institutions."); see also JEAN ANYON, supra note 124, at 23 ("[S]ocial distance
arising in part from lack of common experience and knowledge of each other in people of
difference class and racial backgrounds can impair communication, trust, and joint action
between reformers and school personnel ... and can hamper the implementation of educational
improvement projects.").
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Conversely, stigmatized minorities are disproportionately poor, lacking the
capacity to access private schools or to move to an adjacent district. The
relative inability of stigmatized minorities to exit public schooling leaves
them particularly vulnerable to excessive bureaucracy.
Similarly, the disproportionate poverty of stigmatized minorities
leaves them more susceptible to the regulatory concomitants of external
government funding. Urban districts serving stigmatized minorities
disproportionately depend on federal and state subsidy. 5 Because rules
inevitably accompany government subsidy, urban districts are subject to
even greater bureaucracy than their suburban counterparts. According to
political scientist Wilbur Rich, who spent several years studying the
impediments to effective education in three representative urban districts,
"[s]ince school programs are so dependent upon multiple sources of school
finance, administrative sovereignty [in urban districts] is lost in the
process.226
Moreover, given the relationship of stigma and schools' institutional
conditions, stigmatized minorities are more likely to under-perform
academically.227 This fuels bureaucracy both because school under-
performance encourages government to act-and government generally
acts through regulation-and because the education of stigmatized
minorities, at least since Brown, is a subject of unique political attention.
Simultaneously, the under-performance of stigmatized minorities leaves
districts vulnerable to legal challenge-whether under federal and state
equal-protection provisions or state adequacy provisions. These challenges
lead to judicial mandates, supplementing legislative and administrative
ones, which further constrain school-based discretion to respond flexibly to
student needs. In these ways, the increased public focus on educational
under-performance distinctively applies to districts serving stigmatized
minorities.
The institutional disposition toward bureaucracy betrays the flexibility
needed to address stigma's educational effects. This dissonance might be
lessened if stigmatized minorities had the political power to implement
bureaucratic rules generally responsive to their needs. But even such an
approach would be far from ideal. As developed above, discretion-
removing rules themselves are the problem. Still, across-the-board rules
affirmatively responsive to stigmatic harm, rather than neglectful of it,
would likely reduce stigma's challenge to minorities' educability. Yet, as
discussed below, minorities are poorly positioned to influence public-
225. Corcoran & Goertz, supra note 15, at 41.
226. RICH, supra note 131, at 13.
227. Supra, Part 111.
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school politics in a systemic way. This ultimately results in bureaucratic
rules that generally overlook their particular needs.
C. Stigmatized Minorities Are Unable to Politically Vindicate Their
Educational Interests in Public Schools.
Stigmatized minorities are politically weak and therefore unable to
achieve policies systematically responsive to their educational needs. This
political impotence flows principally from three inter-related sources.
First, stigmatized minorities are minorities and as such are destined to lose
their share of political battles. 8 This disadvantage is particularly pertinent
at the state and federal levels, where education policy increasingly is set.
This is especially true for urban districts, whose budgets depend
disproportionately on state and federal subsidy. Second, stigmatized
minorities are less wealthy than other groups and as a result have a
diminished capacity to influence politics through the strategic use of
money. 9  Third, and perhaps most troubling, stigmatized minorities are
stigmatized, and stigma itself inhibits their ability to participate effectively
in the political process.
First, stigmatized minorities, at least at the state and federal levels, are
numerical minorities and as such are likely to lose more political fights
than they win. Elections in the United States, unlike many other
democracies, are almost exclusively determined on the basis of
majoritarian, "winner take all" principles: candidates win elections by
obtaining a bare majority of votes cast.231 As a consequence, numerical
minorities, by definition, simply do not have enough votes to direct
228. Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 152
(1976) (arguing that African Americans as a group are disenfranchised, in part, because they are a
numerical minority); Elizabeth R. Gerber et al., Minority Representation in Multimember
Districts, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 127, 129 (1998) (arguing for change to electoral system to
remedy functional disenfranchisement of numerical minorities); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 51
(James Madison) ("If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be
insecure.").
229. Spencer Overton, The Donor Class: Campaign Finance, Democracy, and Participation,
153 U. PA. L. REv. 73, 87-89 (2004); see also Rebecca E. Zietlow, Giving Substance to Process:
Countering the Due Process Counterrevolution, 75 DENV. U.L. REv. 9, 41 (1997) (emphasizing
the need for stigmatized groups to resort to judicial remedies because their lack of economic
resources makes the political process largely unresponsive).
230. See, e.g., William E. Adams, Jr., Is it Animus or a Difference of Opinion? The Problems
Caused by the Invidious Intent of Anti-Gay Ballot Measures, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 449, 462
(1998); Fiss, supra note 228, at 152; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival,
97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1585 (1988) (noting that African Americans, women, disabled, homosexuals,
and other disadvantaged groups have historically been excluded from political process).
231. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Lani Guinier and the Dilemma of American Democracy, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 418, 420-421 (1995) (book review).
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electoral outcomes on their own; they need other means, generally the
strategic use of money or coalition-building, to achieve political outcomes.
The highly fragmented character of education politics exacerbates the
political implications of minority status. As discussed above, political
authorities at all levels of government determine education policy. Because
of the continued high rates of residential segregation, stigmatized
minorities tend to disproportionately live in communities populated
primarily by other minorities. This development permits racial minorities
to constitute numerical majorities in many local jurisdictions, enhancing
their ability to influence local politics. But because education policy is
heavily determined by policies set by higher political authorities, the
inability of stigmatized minorities to influence materially political decision-
making at these levels encumbers their ability to realize education policies
reflective of their needs.232 This challenge is particularly pronounced for
urban districts because they rely disproportionately on external government
funding. Consequently, racial minorities depend substantially on the
policymaking of political bodies for which their minority status inhibits
their influence.
Second, stigmatized minorities are politically weak given their
relatively small amounts of wealth, and derivative limited capacity to
influence politics through the strategic use of money. While aggregating
large numbers of voters in a particular interest group is one means of
influencing politics, so is the ability to use money in pursuit of political
aims-whether to support candidates, to influence political opinion, or to
facilitate lobbying efforts. This strategy of course turns on the extent to
which an interest group has disposable income. Stigmatized minorities
have substantially less wealth than Whites, and are therefore disadvantaged
concerning the use of money for political purposes. Specifically, as of
1998, the median household wealth was $10,000 for a Black family, $3,000
for a Hispanic family, and $81,700 for a White family.233 Income figures
are also revealing: in 2001, the median Black household earned $33,598,
the median Hispanic household earned $34,490, while the median White
household earned $54,067.234
These stark inequalities dramatically limit minorities' ability to
influence political outcomes. First, these inequalities hamstring the extent
232. See RICH, supra note 131, at 13 (describing state and federal micro-management of
urban-district policy); HENIG, supra note 131, at 256 (describing prominent role of state
policymaking in urban districts).
233. Edward N. Wolff, Recent Trends in Wealth Ownership, 1983-1988, at tbls. 7-8 (Jerome
Levy Econ. Institute, Working Paper No. 300, 2000), available at http://129.3.20.41/eps/mac/
papers/0004/0004047.pdf.
234. LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 2002/2003 278 (2003).
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to which stigmatized minorities can financially support candidates of
choice.2 35  For example, while African-Americans and Hispanics jointly
comprise almost twenty-five percent of the population, they account for
less than one percent of those who make reportable contributions to federal
candidates.236 Comparable disparities exist in state and local elections. 37
These disparities impede the capacity of candidates preferred by
stigmatized minorities to win competitive elections.238 Moreover, the
disparities apply even to those political jurisdictions predominated by
stigmatized minorities, because Whites primarily finance elections in these
districts too. 239  Stigmatized minorities thus have a reduced capacity to
elect candidates of choice; and the responsiveness even of candidates
preferred by stigmatized minorities is lessened by the degree to which
240financial support derives disproportionately from other communities.
Second, stigmatized minorities have a diminished ability to lobby
government effectively for the redress of grievances. Lobbyists are an
increasingly important vehicle through which modem interest groups
vindicate their political interests. The effectiveness of lobbying efforts
depends on the capacity of constituent groups to marshal money in support
of political objectives. 41 Minorities' lack of wealth undercuts their ability
to lobby effectively for political outcomes reflective of their needs.
Third, and perhaps most insidious, stigma itself compromises
minorities' political agency. Stigma singles out racial minorities as
existentially distinct and thus inhibits their ability to associate with non-
235. Spencer Overton, Racial Disparities and the Political Function of Property, 49 UCLA
L. REV. 1553, 1569-1570 (2002); Terry Smith, Race and Money in Politics, 79 N.C. L. REV.
1469, 1510-1514 (2001).
236. See Overton, supra note 235, at 1569.
237. Id.
238. White predominance of campaign finance, coupled with stigma's role in depressing the
support Whites might otherwise provide minority candidates, causes stigmatized-minority
candidates to be under-funded compared to their competitors. JOHN THEILMANN & AL WILHITE,
DISCRIMINATION AND CONGRESSIONAL CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS 78 (1991); see also Smith,
supra note 235, at 1474 n.15.
239. ROBERT SINGH, THE CONGRESSIONAL BLACK CAUCUS: RACIAL POLITICS IN THE U.S.
CONGRESS 125-26 (1998); Robert C. Smith, Financing Black Politics: A Study of Congressional
Elections, 17 REV. BLACK POL. ECON. 5, 24 (1988).
240. Jamin Raskin & John Bonifaz, Equal Protection and the Wealth Primary, 11 YALE L. &
POL'Y REv. 273, 279 n. 26 (1993) (providing that the relative poverty of stigmatized minorities,
coupled with private financing of campaigns, "systematically favors white candidates and white
interests over minorities" in statewide races and races in majority-white districts).
241. Id. at276-79.
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stigmatized groups.242 These associational harms are politically destructive
because they frustrate minorities' capacity to align with other interest
groups to form majorities on discrete questions.243 Thus, stigma impedes
both the capacity of stigmatized minorities to form political coalitions at
the constituent level, and the ability of individual politicians to form
244policymaking majorities on particular issues. As such, stigma
undermines the alliance building that is vital to the built-in protections
American democracy affords minorities, 245 leaving them chronically
marginal in the political marketplace and uniquely vulnerable to
246majoritarian tyranny.
242. Lenhardt, supra note 75, at 846-47 (discussing extent to which stigma causes
"citizenship harms," which limit the capacity of the racially stigmatized to "belong" in civil
society).
243. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 153
(1980) (providing that, although American democracy depends "on the ability and willingness of
various groups to apprehend those overlapping interests that can bind them into a majority on a
given issue," racism "blinds us to overlapping interests that in fact exist"); Lenhardt, supra note
75, at 846-47 (explaining that the ability of stigmatized groups "to influence decisions and to
develop sustained, interest-enhancing relationships with others has been impaired").
244. See Briffault, supra note 23 1, at 1444-45 (discussing "legislative racism" and extent to
which it preempts African-American politicians not only from developing cross-racial alliances
with White representatives, but also from even influencing the political decision-making of White
representatives).
245. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison) (describing ways in which structure
of American political system can protect minority interests); Lenhardt, supra note 75, at 844-48
(discussing ways in which stigmatized groups experience "citizenship harms").
246. See, e.g., BELL, supra note 34, at 471-73; PAUL FRYMER, UNEASY ALLIANCES: RACE
AND PARTY COMPETITION IN AMERICA 146 (1999); LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE
MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 249 (1994). This of
course does not mean that stigmatized minorities are never able to obtain political benefits
consistent with their needs. First, the social rigidity of stigma is not static; it changes over time as
social norms change. Contemporary stigmatization undoubtedly is less stultifying than historical
manifestations of stigma, when racial stigma was an explicit, consciously accepted given of
American social life. Second, political outcomes consistent with the needs of the stigmatized
sometimes overlap with the political desires of Whites. In circumstances of such "interest
convergence," to use Derrick Bell's terminology, the political needs of stigmatized minorities
benefit as an ancillary consequence of policies principally designed to serve the needs of Whites.
DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED
HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 59-68 (2004). From this perspective, many of the more prominent
positive political developments ostensibly serving the needs of stigmatized minorities-the Civil
Rights Acts; the Voting Rights Act; and various Great Society programs-primarily serve
majoritarian, rather than minority, needs. DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE
ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 51-74 (1987); see also Derrick A. Bell Jr., Bakke, Minority
Admissions, and the Usual Price of Racial Remedies, 67 CAL. L. REV. 3, 7, 16-17 (1979)
(providing that Black political and social progress is achieved only when the gains create a clear
benefit to Whites). But see JOHN D. GRIFFIN & BRUCE NEWMAN, RACE, POLITICAL EQUALITY,
AND PLURALISM: REPRESENTATION IN BLACK AND WHITE, available at http://www.nd.edu/
-jgriffi /RaceRep.pdf (discussing general political weakness of African-Americans, but noting
enhanced influence on explicitly racial policies).
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In addition to stigma's direct political effects, it also exacerbates the
political disabilities linked to minorities' lack of wealth. For much of
American history, the law, supported by prevailing social and cultural
norms, protected a caste system in which economic capacity was co-
extensive with racial identity.247 The legacy of that system reverberates
today, both concerning the economic deficit stigmatized children inherit at
birth, 248 and the continued ways stigma-informed prejudice limits economic
opportunity. 249  Stigma, in this way, affects the political facility of
stigmatized minorities because it spawns the economic inequalities that, in
turn, fuel political weakness.
In these ways, stigmatized minorities are weakly positioned to
politically achieve education policies systematically reflective of their
needs. These intrinsic limitations are conspicuous in the education context.
State and federal government, as discussed, set baseline education policies,
and minorities are particularly vulnerable to undesirable rulemaking at
these levels. The broader the jurisdiction, the more the aggregated effects
of minority status, poverty, and stigma restrict stigmatized minorities'
political influence. Wilbur Rich, in his study of urban-district politics,
found that local African-American officeholders do not have the "authority
to make fundamental changes in education institutions"-state mandates,
which racial minorities did not have the political ability to change, dictated
educational priorities.'
5°
247. See, e.g., Spencer Overton, But Some Are More Equal: Race, Exclusion and Campaign
Finance, 80 TEX. L. REV. 987, 1004-06 (describing variety of ways in which legal constructs
constrained minority economic advancement).
248. See MISHEL ET AL., supra note 234 (illustrating that, as of 1998, the average net wealth
of a White household was $320,900, while the average net wealth of a Black household was only
$58,300).
249. Overton, supra note 247, at 1021-25 (arguing that political and economic disadvantages
continue to exist despite formal prohibition of discrimination). For example, although the Black
middle class continues to grow at unprecedented rates, Black college graduates earn significantly
less than White college graduates. U.S. Census Bureau, Income 2000, http://www.census.gov/
hhes/www/income/income00/inctabl0.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2007) (showing that in 2000, the
median income for a Black college graduate is $40,360, while the median income for a White
college graduate is $51,099). The income differential between Black and White workers results
in Black college graduates earning $500,000 less than White college graduates throughout their
careers. DEDRICK MUHAMMAD ET AL., THE STATE OF THE DREAM 2004, at 1 (Jan. 15, 2004),
available at http://www.faireconomy.org/press/2004/StateoftheDream2004.pdf. Over the course
of a Black high school graduate's career, he or she would earn $300,000 less than his or her
White counterpart. Id. Terry Smith discusses, in addition, how White politicians exploit wealth
disparities by subsidizing subtle-and sometimes not-so-subtle-racial appeals that seek to
capitalize politically on stigma. Smith, supra note 235, at 1475, 1482-91 (discussing White
candidates use of the "Willie Horton" motif to exploit politically racial stigma).
250. RICH, supra note 131, at 214-16; see also HENIG, supra note 131, at 9.
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Moreover, even at the local level, minorities' sparse political resources
encumber their ability to realize education policies reflective of their needs.
Unions, in particular, are highly influential in school-board elections, and
local school politics generally, possessing political resources as strong as
those of stigmatized minorities are weak.25 1  Urban-district unions are
especially well organized. They possess significant numbers of voting
members-at least in light of low voter turnout in school-board elections-
and have substantial amounts of money to spend on campaigning.
252
Largely due to disparities in political resources, union interests are heavily
represented on local school boards, especially in urban districts.253 Thus,
when unions negotiate public-school collective-bargaining agreements,
they often do so across the table from school-board members the union
elected. 4  Because stigmatized minorities are politically weak, they are
unable to apply sufficient pressure on school boards to countervail union
demands. The result is the kind of stultifying work rules discussed above,
which grant teachers and other school personnel a range of labor
protections that impede school discretion to tailor operations to student
needs.
In sum, the concomitants of stigmatized minorities' status preclude
them from realizing education policies systematically responsive to stigma.
Stigmatized minorities are without sufficient numbers to direct political
outcomes. Minorities, moreover, have little disposable income, leaving
them without the ability to subsidize the mechanics of obtaining and
leveraging political influence. Finally, they are stigmatized, subject to a
condition that obstructs their ability to ally with comparably interested
groups in pursuing common political goals. Minorities, in these ways, are
weakly positioned both to affirmatively shape education politics toward
their own ends and to defensively ward off the neglectful, if not hostile,
education politics of other interest groups.
251. Of course in local, particularly urban, jurisdictions, many members of the union are
stigmatized minorities themselves. But the very purpose of the union is to advocate for members'
labor interests, and unions uniformly support lockstep evaluation, compensation, and discipline
policies as a means of protecting most members' job status. Union members thus are
institutionally disposed to perceive their job protections as consonant with student needs.
252. William A. Galston, The Politics of Polarization: Education Debates in the United
States, in INSTITUTIONS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra note 15, at
57, 72; Hess & West, Strike Phobia, supra note 162, at 43-44. See generally CHUBB & MOE,
POLITICS, supra note 131, at 173.
253. See, e.g., Terry Moe, A Union by Any Other Name 43-44, EDUC. NEXT, Fall 2001,
available at http://www.educationnext.org/20013/38moe.pdf.
254. Hess & West, Strike Phobia, supra note 162, at 43-44.
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V. Conclusion: The Need for Institutional Remedies
This Article challenges the failure of courts and advocates considering
remedies in school cases to assess whether public schools, as currently
constituted, are institutionally aligned with minorities' educational needs.
Numerous legal scholars have written about the longstanding failure of
public schools to satisfy these norms, but they have overlooked the
relationship of public schools' institutional context to the educational
consequences of stigma. This Article argues that because stigma attacks
the capacities enabling education, services must specifically account for
stigma's noxious effects on racial minorities' educability. Stigma
distinctively affects minorities' educational fortunes both collectively and
individually. As a class, the challenge posed by stigma necessarily affects
only the stigmatized. Individually, children have different levels of access
to resources combating stigma and also cope variably with stigma.
Schools, therefore, need flexibility to respond not only to the unique class-
wide harms engendered by stigma but also its particular manifestations in
individual children.
Nonetheless, traditional public schools are highly bureaucratic and
rule-bound, preempting the flexibility minorities require. This disposition
toward uniformity is not coincidental. Rather, it is central to political
accountability, especially in urban districts disproportionately serving
minorities. Furthermore, because they are minorities, relatively poor, and
stigmatized, racial minorities cannot politically obtain bureaucratic rules
consistently responsive to their needs. My critique, in sum, contends that
public schools are institutionally predisposed toward uniformity, and that
this predisposition impedes the flexibility needed to address the unique
educational challenges presented by stigma.
The upshot of my analysis is that courts and advocates need to
consider the propriety of institutional remedies in cases finding inadequate
education for stigmatized minorities. Remedies, to this point, have focused
principally on the resources available to public schools, not the institutional
constraints on public schools. These traditional remedies usually involve
racial integration, school finance, curricular reform, or some combination
of the three. Each of these options undoubtedly has positive benefits, but
their effectiveness is limited by public schools' institutional limitations.
Appropriate institutional design, however, is a necessary but
insufficient condition. The institutional flexibility to meet minorities'
unique needs both collectively and individually does not guarantee that
schools will wisely use that flexibility. Nor by itself does flexibility ensure
quality teachers, adequate resources, or challenging curricula. Still, while
institutional structure does not guarantee positive outcomes, it does
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structurally dispose schools toward these outcomes. So even though
flexibility by itself does not necessitate its wise use, flexibility, an
educational imperative for minorities, cannot be used wisely if it is not
possessed in the first instance. In fashioning institutional remedies,
therefore, courts must start from the foundational principle that stigmatized
minorities require schools with the discretion to nimbly craft services to
student needs. Because unchecked political accountability yields
bureaucratic uniformity, courts necessarily must consider institutional
designs that minimize the influence of political decision-making. Then,
building on that foundation, courts should also consider additional
structural components that induce schools to use discretion optimally to
serve minorities' educational needs.
I do not intend this Article to provide a comprehensive analysis of the
variety of institutional arrangements responsive to my critique. Multiple
options exist, and courts should widely consider potential models in light of
local conditions. I also hope others will be interested in further exploring
the implications of my argument, and further theorizing responsive
institutional approaches. That noted, I nonetheless offer preliminary
outlines of two kinds of institutional remedies potentially better suited than
the traditional model to minorities' educational needs: charter-schools and
private-school choice.
Charters are schools of parental choice in which non-governmental
entities are granted contracts to run public schools substantially free from
government regulation. Depending on the scope of deregulation, charters
might possess sufficient flexibility to adapt services to student needs.
Moreover, because charters' institutional design permits non-governmental
entities to run public schools, and simultaneously allows parents to leave if
they are dissatisfied, the design protects against undue political influence
on policymaking. Institutionally, a deregulated charter-school design not
only grants the flexibility to adapt services to student needs, but also
structurally encourages charters to focus on student rather than political
outcomes. 5
Furthermore, a well-designed charter model alters the institutional
conditions governing traditional public schools by introducing external
competition. When that competition reaches critical mass, it induces public
schools to more flexibly approach minorities' needs. Competition
mitigates the bureaucratic effects of monopoly on traditional public
schools, which in turn pushes traditional schools to respond less to political
255. See, e.g., CHESTER E. FINN, JR. ET AL., CHARTER SCHOOLS IN ACTION: RENEWING
PUBLIC EDUCATION 14-15 (2000).
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priorities. 256  Because stigmatized minorities have unique educational
needs, these incentives, over time, would likely persuade political
authorities to grant traditional public schools greater flexibility to respond
to student needs.
In fact, many charters schools, though still in their infancy, 257 have
already exploited their institutional flexibility in service of student needs.
Some charters use longer school days and school years; some focus their
curriculum in specialty areas where students are struggling; some
implement merit-pay systems; some focus on the challenges facing discrete
student populations; some use larger class sizes given uncompromising
commitments to teacher quality; and some fire teachers immediately for
failed student performance. 258  These adaptations merely illustrate the
diverse ways charters have sought to meet student needs. Significantly,
even at this early stage, charters have exploited this flexibility to produce
significant improvements in stigmatized minorities' academic
performance.
259
On the debit side, not all charter-school laws are created equal. In
many states, charters' institutional design is not all that different from
traditional public schools. In these systems, only political agencies may
grant or renew charter applications, and only political agencies are
responsible for oversight. These designs depend principally on political
256. Empirical work thus far is somewhat inconclusive on the particular effects of charter
schools on the functioning of traditional public schools. Compare, e.g., CAROLINE M. HOXBY,
HOW CHOICE AFFECTS THE ACHIEVEMENT OF PUBLIC SCHOOL STUDENTS 9-16 (2001), available
at http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/hoxby/papers/choice_sep01.pdf (finding charter
schools precipitate improved student outcomes in traditional public schools) with HELEN F.
LADD, MARKET-BASED REFORMS IN URBAN EDUCATION, 7-9 (2000), available at
http://archive.epinet.org/realmedia/01011 1/materials/Ladd.pdf (finding inconclusive research on
spillover effects of charter schools on traditional schools). This is substantially attributable both
to the fact that charter programs, comparatively, serve very small numbers of students-and thus
present weak competitive threats-and that, as discussed below, wide variation exists in charter-
school designs. Concerning this latter issue, only depoliticized designs are likely to produce the
institutional incentives I describe here.
257. Charters, about a decade old, serve merely 1.5% of students attending public schools.
See CAROLINE M. HOXBY, ACHIEVEMENT IN CHARTER SCHOOLS AND REGULAR PUBLIC
SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES: UNDERSTANDING THE DIFFERENCES 3 (2004), available at
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/hoxby/papers/hoxbycharter dec.pdf.
258. See, e.g., BRYAN C. HASSEL, THE CHARTER SCHOOL CHALLENGE: AVOIDING THE
PITFALLS, FULFILLING THE PROMISES 75-104 (1999); BILL TRIANT, AUTONOMY AND
INNOVATION: HOW Do MASSACHUSETTS CHARTER SCHOOL PRINCIPALS USE THEIR FREEDOM?
(2001), available at http://www.edexcellence.net/foundation/publication/publication.cfm?id
= 18&
pubsubid=67&doc=pdf.
259. See HOXBY, supra note 257; see also Jay Matthews, High Scores Fail to Clear
Obstacles to KIPP Growth, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2006, at A1O (discussing extraordinary results
of stigmatized minorities in charter-school network characterized by a substantially longer school
day, school week, and school year than traditional schools).
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oversight and, given my critique, are likely to re-distribute to charters much
of the bureaucratic micro-management applicable to traditional public
schools. This precise result is evident in many states, where increasing
state mandates have impeded charter schools' capacity to adapt their
services to student needs. 6°
Moreover, even states granting charters substantial freedom from
regulation impose prohibitive barriers to entry. States generally grant
charters merely a fraction of the per-pupil funding afforded traditional
public schools. For example, one recent study showed charters receive
twenty-two percent less per-pupil funding than traditional schools. 261 Even
worse, states generally exclude charters from facilities funding, forcing
charters not only to lease or purchase a schoolhouse on the open market,
but to do so using the already reduced per-pupil subsidy. In contrast,
traditional public schools generally receive both a free school building and
state funding for capital needs. Institutional and resource burdens restrain
charter-school effectiveness, either inhibiting the flexibility needed to meet
student needs, or impeding schools' ability to exploit flexibility by starving
them of needed resources.262
Thus, in considering remedies, courts should evaluate whether
charters' institutional design permits the flexibility needed to meet
minorities' needs. Institutional designs that rely less on political
accountability are more likely to produce this flexibility. Some of the key
features of an appropriate institutional design include: (1) the ability of
multiple non-governmental authorities to grant, renew and monitor
charters; (2) a charter term significantly longer than the often-used five-
year period; and (3) strictly limited government regulation. 63 In addition
to these institutional ingredients, effective models also grant charters
260. See, e.g., LOUANN BIERLEIN PALMER & REBECCA GAU, CHARTER SCHOOL
AUTHORIZING: ARE STATES MAKING THE GRADE? 1-2 (June 2003), available at
http://www.edexcellence.net/doc/AuthO3ExecSummary.pdf; see also Robert J. Martin, Rigid
Rules for Charter Schools: New Jersey as a Case Study, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 439, 443 (2005).
261. THOMAS FORDHAM INSTITUTE, CHARTER SCHOOL FUNDING: INEQUITY'S NEXT
FRONTIER 1-2 (2005), available at http://www.edexcellence.net/doc/
Charter/o2OSchool%2OFunding%202005 %20FINAL.pdf
262. See, e.g., HOXBY, supra note 257 ("Charter school students are more likely to have a
proficiency advantage if their state has a strong charter school law that gives the schools
autonomy and that ensures that charter schools get funding equal to at least 40 percent of the total
per-pupil funding of regular public schools.").
263. See, e.g., CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, THE SIMPLE GUIDE TO CHARTER SCHOOL LAWS: A
PROGRESS REPORT 1-26 (Jeanne Allen & Anna Varghese Marcucio eds., 2005), available at
http://www.edreform.corn/_upload/simpleguide.pdf (discussing need for charter models to
include multiple chartering authorities, school autonomy, and exemptions from collective
bargaining); see also THOMAS FORDHAM INSTITUTE, supra note 261, at 1-2, 21-23 (discussing
various charter authorizing models).
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adequate and stable finding.264 At any rate, courts can manipulate these
structural elements to adapt the model to fit local conditions and discrete
concerns.
Concerning the limitation on government regulation, I would suggest
limiting mandates principally to educational outcomes-whether children
achieve the competitive and civic competencies driving state Education
Clauses-and a small set of procedural mandates, principally anti-
discrimination prohibitions and vital health-and-safety rules. These limited
mandates, however, would not be the only form of oversight. The non-
governmental chartering agencies and, perhaps even more importantly,
parents themselves through the exercise of choice, also possess significant
oversight responsibilities. 265 The chartering agencies may impose across-
the-board mandates reflecting essential priorities, but the relatively
apolitical nature of these agencies, coupled with parental choice,
structurally encourages these agencies to impose only those rules necessary
to effectively meet student needs. This institutional design diversifies
oversight in an effort to promote flexibility while permitting discrete,
limited rules on essential public commitments.
Practically, courts considering charter remedies have a few options.
At least forty states have laws authorizing charter schools.266 Courts in
these states should first evaluate the structure of their states' design. If the
design permits the flexibility needed to meet minorities' needs and
eliminates prohibitive barriers to entry, courts should consider compelling
districts to turn a relevant number of traditional schools into charters. 267 If,
on the other hand, courts face charter designs too limiting to allow needed
flexibility, courts should consider compelling districts to turn a critical
mass of traditional schools into charters, but with designs amended to
ensure flexibility and optimal ability to exploit flexibility in the service of
student needs. As discussed above, this might include orders giving non-
governmental entities authority to grant charters, extending the length of
charter contracts, and removing regulatory constraints governing charters.
264. See CTR. FOR EDUC. REFORM, supra note 263, at 1-26.
265. Sensible choice depends significantly on access to accurate information about school
quality. States generally publish school report cards and other information on school
performance and conditions. Courts of course can require defending states to supplement these
efforts as necessary in individual cases.
266. See HOXBY, supra note 257, at 3.
267. Although such a judicial remedy would be unprecedented-primarily because, as
discussed above, courts have neglected institutional limitations on public schools ability to serve
minorities-it is not unprecedented as a policy matter. NCLB currently requires "restructuring"
for schools failing to meet prescribed performance standards for six years; among other things,
this "restructuring" may include turning a traditional school into a charter school. See 20 U.S.C.
§ 6316(b)(8)(B)(i-v) (2006).
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Finally, courts in states without charter laws should nonetheless consider
forcing school boards to turn traditional schools into charters. In the
special-education context, for example, courts have required governments
to contract with or reimburse external providers when public schools have
268
proven incapable of effectively delivering services.
A second institutional remedy courts should consider is private-school
choice. A private-school choice remedy would permit minorities to attend
private schools with the public subsidy otherwise available for traditional-
school attendance. Private schools are free from all but the most critical
forms of government oversight, and therefore have more institutional
flexibility than charters to adapt school policy to student needs. Moreover,
because private schools are essentially unaccountable to political
agencies-even to the quasi-governmental authorities characterizing a
liberal charter design-the private-school model is the most institutionally
depoliticized design available. In addition, for reasons discussed above
concerning charter schools, the availability of private choice also alters
public schools' institutional environment. As increasing numbers of
students attend private schools, the incentives governing public-school
policymaking shift closer toward student needs and away from political
ones. In fact, there already is evidence that school-choice remedies,
significantly because of private schools' institutional flexibility, more
effectively serve the educational needs of stigmatized minorities than
traditional public schools. 269 And this is in a context where the efficacy of
choice programs is limited by poor funding and constrained student
eligibility. Private schools participating in choice programs receive small
per-pupil subsidies, often receiving amounts even less than charter schools
receive. And current programs generally permit only insubstantial numbers
of students to participate. 27°
268. See, e.g., Sch. Comm. v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359 (1985).
269. See, e.g., GREENE, supra note 66, at 147-56 (analyzing competing empirical studies on
school choice and finding highest-quality studies show consistent improvements, especially for
African-American students). But see, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SCHOOL VOUCHERS:
PUBLICLY FUNDED PROGRAMS IN CLEVELAND AND MILWAUKEE (2001), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01914.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2007) (finding no meaningful
improvement in performance outcomes of students participating in voucher programs).
270. Only a handful of voucher programs exist. See, e.g., David Salisbury, What Does a
Voucher Buy? The Cost of Private Schools in Six Cities, in EDUCATIONAL FREEDOM IN URBAN
AMERICA: BROWN V. BOARD AFTER HALF A CENTURY, supra note 161 (describing how
Cleveland, Milwaukee, Washington, D.C., New York City, and Dayton, Ohio have implemented
voucher programs); see also Fla. Dept. of Educ., Opportunity Scholarship Program,
http://www.floridaschoolchoice.org/Information/OSP/ (describing small Florida voucher program
recently struck down by the Florida Supreme Court). And these programs are small in scope,
generally limited to serving small percentages of students.
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I would not suggest that a private-school choice remedy necessarily
include private schools of whatever sort. Government subsidizes education
to achieve public purposes, and the autonomy of private schools must be
restrained as necessary to ensure satisfaction of these goals. Just as I would
advocate minimal government regulation of educational outcomes and
narrow procedural matters for charter schools, I would also propose similar
regulation of private schools participating in a choice remedy. In
individual cases, courts and advocates should consider additional rules that
reflect local conditions and essential priorities. But these mandates should
be few and narrow. After all, over-regulation is the root problem. And
courts should remember that parents themselves, through the choice to
enter and exit, provide ongoing oversight.27'
In considering the propriety of a private-choice model, courts must
consider the available supply of private schools willing to participate in the
remedial scheme. Particularly in urban districts disproportionately serving
minorities, substantial numbers of private schools seem willing to join
adequately funded choice programs in which government regulation is
unobtrusive. Courts must evaluate local conditions-mindful that suppliers
gravitate to opportunity-in evaluating the propriety and scope of a
private-choice remedy. Further, because charters and private-choice are
compatible, courts should consider blending or combining these approaches
in fashioning locally responsive institutional remedies.
I anticipate several criticisms of these two approaches, and offer
preliminary responses. Many argue that charters or private-choice schools
exacerbate racial segregation. This claim is misplaced for two reasons.
First, the segregation critique, focused on inputs, is incidental: institutional
remedies place no structural limitation on the demographic profile of
student bodies. Integration is as compatible with these alternative
institutional approaches as the traditional one.
Second, there is little evidence on the merits that a charter or private-
choice remedy would worsen segregation; if anything, these remedies
would likely lessen it. Because of stark residential segregation, coupled
with school assignment by neighborhood, public schools are currently
highly segregated.272 Assignment policies unlinked to residence, like
charters and school choice, are more likely to facilitate integration.
273
In addition to the integrationist critique, some claim charters and
private-choice programs promote a civic balkanization inconsistent with
271. See supra note 265 on role of government in ensuring parental access to reliable
information.
272. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
273. See, e.g., GREENE, supra note 66, at 201-16.
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the socialization values purportedly served by traditional public schools. It
is doubtful, however, that traditional public schools, particularly given
acute racial and economic segregation, effectively serve these interests.274
In fact, it may be that public schools' general shortcomings in educating
students also apply to their success in inculcating civic values.275 Likewise,
neither charters nor private schools are incapable of achieving these goals.
In fact, these schools may be more effective on this issue given their
comparative success in achieving educational goals.2 76
Ultimately, it is not my intent here to advance any particular
institutional design as the principal arrangement responsive to my critique.
Charter-school and private-school choice models are simply two
possibilities, and each category permits numerous permutations to account
for context-specific factors. In individual cases, courts and advocates
should evaluate institutional design in light of local conditions and the
nature of the case-specific predicate concerning the incompatibility of
traditional public-school designs and minorities' particular educational
needs. Rather, I offer a general overview of the educational consequences
of stigma, public schools' disposition toward bureaucratic uniformity, and
minorities' political inability to systematically influence school
bureaucracies. The degree to which these elements encumber the ability of
a specific school district to effectively educate minorities turns on the facts
of individual cases. Similarly, the kinds of responsive institutional designs
turn on these case-specific facts.
Rather than offering a definitive remedial account, this Article asserts
that public schools' institutional design is incompatible with stigmatized
minorities' educational entitlements. This contribution radically inverts the
ways courts have approached remedies for minorities in education cases.
Courts and advocates currently focus on re-ordering the resources available
to public schools, but overlook institutional dynamics governing the way
public schools use those resources in service of minorities' educational
needs. This Article shows the necessity of considering institutional design,
encouraging courts and advocates to craft remedies likely to structurally
enable effective education for minorities. Until we account institutionally
for stigmatized minorities' educational needs, the promise of Brown will
remain unfulfilled.
274. See, e.g., GROGAN & PROSCIO, supra note 131, at 215-16 (discussing ways children are
sorted politically, economically, and culturally in public schools).
275. See, e.g., Joseph Viterriti, Choosing Equality: Religious Freedom and Educational
Opportunity Under Constitutional Federalism, 15 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 113, 192 (1996);
GROGAN & PROSCIO, supra note 131, at 215-16.
276. See, e.g., Viterriti, supra note 275, at 184-86.
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